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Articles
CONTESTED SHORE: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
RECLAIMED LAND AND THE BATTLE
FOR STREETERVILLE
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill
ABSTRACT—Land reclaimed from navigable waters is a resource uniquely
susceptible to conflict. The multiple reasons for this include traditional
hostility to interference with navigable waterways and the weakness of
rights in submerged land. In Illinois, title to land reclaimed from Lake
Michigan was further clouded by a shift in judicial understanding in the
late nineteenth century about who owned the submerged land, starting with
an assumption of private ownership but eventually embracing state
ownership. The potential for such legal uncertainty to produce conflict is
vividly illustrated by the history of the area of Chicago known as
Streeterville, the area of reclaimed land along Lake Michigan north of the
Chicago River and east of Michigan Avenue. Beginning in the 1850s,
Streeterville was subject to repeated waves of litigation, assertions of
squatters’ rights (most notably by George Wellington Streeter, for whom
the area is named), conspiracies to obtain federal land grants based on
veterans’ rights, schemes in reliance on claims of Native Americans, and a
public works project designed to secure the claims of wealthy riparian
owners. The riparian owners eventually won the many-sided battle, but
only after convincing institutions such as Northwestern University to build
substantial structures on the land. The history of Streeterville suggests that
when legal title to reclaimed land is highly uncertain, conflict over control
of the land is likely to persist until one or more persons succeed in
establishing what is perceived to be possession of the land.
AUTHORS—Joseph D. Kearney is Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette
University Law School. Thomas W. Merrill is the Charles Evans Hughes
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The authors wish to acknowledge
Holly E. Courtney, Kurt F. Ellison, Barry P. Gill, Patrick C. Greeley,
Theodore J. Greeley, Matthew J. Jann, Noel H. Johnson, Aidan M. Morrell,
and John T. Murphy for valuable research assistance; Philip C. Babler and
participants in a faculty workshop at Northwestern University School of
Law and in the Property Works in Progress Conference 2012 held at
Fordham Law School for comments on a draft; Kevin B. Leonard and Julia
S. Bachrach for archival suggestions; and Leslie Evans for Figures 19 and
21. The historical documents cited in notes 309–10, 312–36, and 328–31
are available in the Northwestern University Archives.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of Chicago suggests that reclaimed land—that is, land
artificially created where water once stood—is a resource uniquely prone to
conflict. This Article recounts a particular multisided dispute over
reclaimed land in the Chicago neighborhood called Streeterville.1 The land
in question was created by a combination of natural accretion, unauthorized
landfilling, and a legally sanctioned public works project. The result was
great uncertainty about who had title to the new terra firma. This
uncertainty over property rights ignited a struggle lasting decades that
featured not only litigation and special interest legislation but also fraud
and outright violence.
The battle over property rights in Streeterville can be divided into
three periods. The first, which lasted from roughly 1850 to 1885, was
relatively decorous, consisting largely of litigation over rights to land
formed by natural accretion. The second, from roughly 1885 to 1915, was
intense and largely extralegal. This period included, most famously, gun
battles between the followers of the notorious squatter, George Wellington
Streeter, and private guards hired by wealthy Chicago landowners who
1

“Streeterville” is an informal name given to an area of Chicago, just north of the Chicago River,
whose boundaries are somewhat imprecise. For general purposes in this Article, we regard Streeterville
as encompassing the area north of the Chicago River and south of Oak Street that lay beneath Lake
Michigan when Chicago was originally founded as a city. This makes St. Clair Street roughly the
western border of the area.
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claimed title to the area based on riparian rights. This period also featured a
conspiracy to secure the land using scrip given to the survivors of a
Mexican War hero and a scheme to claim the land for a branch of the
Potawatomi Indians, who had occupied the area before white settlers
arrived. The third period, from roughly 1915 to 1930, was when the
wealthy landowners who claimed the land by riparian rights consolidated
their control over the area, abetted by construction of structures by
institutions of impeccable social standing, most notably Northwestern
University.
One question raised by the history of Streeterville is why it took so
long for the struggle over the newly formed land to be resolved. The
answer would seem to be that as long as the reclaimed land stood vacant, it
remained, in the minds of many, a resource that was up for grabs—and as
long as it was perceived as being up for grabs, competition to establish
property rights in the land continued. This competition, in turn, discouraged
development of the land, which meant that it remained vacant and hence
continued to be perceived as being up for grabs. The matter was resolved
only when the claimants with the most resources started to build substantial
structures on the reclaimed land. This eliminated the perception that the
land was open to capture and instead fostered an understanding that it was
no different from other solid land that was actively possessed.
Another question posed by the history of Streeterville is why the
reclaimed land in this area of the City is overwhelmingly held in private
ownership, whereas the reclaimed land south of the Chicago River, in what
is now Grant Park, is public. The public trust doctrine, which arose out of
conflict over control of filled land in the area of Grant Park, is not the
explanation.2 The public trust doctrine applied to the reclaimed land in both
areas but was found by the Illinois Supreme Court to pose no barrier to the
grant of private ownership rights in Streeterville.3 The main reason for the
difference rather is that Grant Park—as well as Lincoln Park to the north
and Burnham Park to the south—came to be actively controlled by public
entities such as the Chicago Park District. Reclaimed land that is actively
monitored by a public entity can suppress the perception that the land is up
for grabs. Such public control came late to Streeterville and applied only to
the outer perimeter formed by Lake Shore Drive and associated public
walkways and beaches, as we shall describe. By the time public control of
the perimeter was established, private ownership of the interior had been
secured by private development. Grant Park was also protected by a public
dedication promising that the land in that area was “for ever to remain
2

See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (providing an
overview of the public trust doctrine and its origins in controversies involving land in modern-day
Grant Park).
3
See People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 152–53, 45 N.E. 830, 835 (1896).
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vacant of buildings.”4 This public dedication was vigorously enforced by
abutting private landowners, most notably Montgomery Ward.5 No such
public dedication restricted development in Streeterville.
We begin in Part I by considering general background conditions that
promote uncertainty about the ownership of reclaimed land, together with
factors aggravating this uncertainty in Illinois in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. We then trace, in Parts II–VI, the history of
Streeterville, from its origins as Kinzie’s Addition in the 1830s, through the
period of natural accretion, to Streeter’s efforts to establish squatters’
rights, to the conspiracies associated with the McKee scrip and Potawatomi
claims, to the efforts of the wealthy riparian owners to secure rights
through the auspices of the Lincoln Park Commission. Part VII describes
how the apparent victory of the riparian owners in the Kirk decision of
1896 failed to end the contestation over property rights, which persisted
into the 1920s. Finally, Part VIII argues that the legal uncertainty ended
only with the construction of substantial structures on the reclaimed land,
including Northwestern’s Chicago campus.
I. UNCERTAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RECLAIMED LAND
Uncertainty about property rights in Streeterville was partially a
function of certain features that are common to reclaimed land everywhere.
The uncertainty was aggravated by factors that applied with particular force
to Illinois in the second half of the nineteenth century. We begin in section
A with the features common to reclaimed land generally and then turn in
sections B and C to the Illinois-specific factors.
A. Weak Property Rights in Submerged Land
One reason rights to reclaimed land are uncertain is that property
rights in submerged land—the substratum on which such reclaimed land
rests—are weak. With respect to solid land, no one questions that soil or
structures added to the land belong to the owner of the solid land.6 In
contrast, when soil or other fill is added to submerged land, there is no
equivalent understanding that the reclaimed land automatically belongs to
the owner of the submerged land. Why the difference?

4

See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago
Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1426–27
(2011) (detailing the history, means, and extent of the preservation of the land in modern-day Grant
Park as open space).
5
See id. at 1464–1500.
6
This is a function of the ad coelum doctrine, short for cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et
ad inferos (he who owns the soil owns to the sky and to the depths), which is in turn a manifestation of
the general principle of accession. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 467 (2009) (providing an overview of the doctrine).
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Property rights in submerged land are weak in significant part because
of the strong public interest in the water that lies above the submerged land.
The water itself—certainly if it is navigable—has always been regarded as
an open-access resource. From Roman times to English common law to the
present, navigable waters have been regarded as a resource that should be
kept open to the general public for travel by boat or for fishing.7 In modern
times, recreational uses (e.g., swimming or rafting) and so-called
ecosystem services (e.g., habitat for waterfowl or spawning grounds for
fish) have been added to the list of public interests in bodies of water.8 If
these interests are to be protected, submerged land must not be developed
in ways that would interfere with public values. To take the most obvious
example, submerged land should not be divided into multiple parcels
having exclusion rights in the overflowing water, since this would create
impossible transaction-cost barriers for those wishing to use the water for
navigation or fishing.9
Property rights in submerged land are also weak because of certain
physical attributes of the resource. Submerged land is typically unoccupied
and undeveloped. It is also invisible in most circumstances—it is masked
by the water, which ordinarily does not permit observation of the land from
the surface. Because it is normally unoccupied and invisible, it is difficult
to determine if it has been disturbed or invaded. Indeed, the traditional
assumption about submerged land—which is still the law with respect to
the deep seas beyond the exclusive economic zone—is that it is not owned
or possessed by anyone.10 Like the water above it, submerged land is
commonly assumed to be an open-access resource or commons. This
undoubtedly remains the public perception even with respect to submerged
land near the shore or under inland lakes.
The weakness of property rights in submerged land is revealed when
particular economic values associated with that land become salient, such
as a desire to harvest shellfish from the submerged land, or to salvage a
sunken vessel and its cargo, or to drill for oil and gas below the seabed. The
invisibility of submerged land and the associated difficulty of establishing
secure property rights in such land mean that competitive races often break
out when such values emerge. Indeed, competitions are common with

7

For good historical surveys, see Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An
Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976), and Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in
the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That
Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975).
8
See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8:20, at 482–84 (Rowan Seidel
& Barbara J. Hagen eds., 2012).
9
See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382 (1993).
10
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 57–58, 60, 89, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); H.J.W. COULSON & URQUHART
A. FORBES, THE LAW RELATING TO WATERS, SEA, TIDAL, AND INLAND 2, 13–14 (2d ed. 1902).
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respect to sunken vessels,11 rights to oyster beds,12 and rights to drill for oil
and gas.13
The legal doctrines that apply when some Act of God such as a storm
or flood causes new land to appear or disappear also reveal the relative
weakness of property rights in submerged lands. From Roman times to the
present, a distinction has been recognized between gradual and
imperceptible changes to shorelines and sudden and perceptible changes.14
Both types of changes can be seen as presenting a conflict between the
owner of the submerged land and the owner of the adjacent riparian land.
Gradual and imperceptible changes—accretion, erosion, and
reliction—augment or diminish the rights of the owner of the adjacent
riparian land. What is particularly significant about these doctrines, for
present purposes, is that the riparian owner is regarded as the one having
the most significant connection to any new land. In terms of the principle
of accession—which includes accretion (gradual accumulation of land) and
reliction (gradual recession of water)15—the existing solid land, where
possession is already securely established, is regarded as the prominent
asset to which the new resource attaches. The submerged land, where
ownership is not associated with any actual occupation and is invisible, has
a much weaker claim on the new resource.16
Changes that are sudden and perceptible, called avulsions, do not
result in any modification of property boundaries.17 If a large chunk of land
suddenly washes away in a hurricane, the boundary remains as it was
before, although some of the riparian owner’s land is now submerged.
Similarly, if a river suddenly breaks through an oxbow, isolating a parcel of
11

See, e.g., Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861). In modern times, the competition for wrecks is
likely to pit salvors against governments, which have taken to claiming wrecks based on sovereign
ownership of the vessels or the submerged land in which they are found. See, e.g., Odyssey Marine
Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
federal court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over a wreck discovered by a salvage company, given
evidence submitted by the government of Spain that it was a military vessel).
12
See, e.g., BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND
ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 135–37 (1998).
13
See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 91–93,
101–03 (Palgrave MacMillan, 2d ed. 2004) (1986) (recounting the conflict over allocation of rights to
North Sea oil and how that allocation deviated from the legal rights to submerged land reflected in
international law).
14
See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed,
23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010) (tracing the history of the distinction and its reception in American
law).
15
See TARLOCK, supra note 8, § 3:44, at 84–85; Merrill, supra note 6, at 465–66.
16
Where accession operates, “small objects become accessions to great ones, and not great to
small.” 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 328 n.75 (David Fate Norton & Mary
J. Norton eds., Clarendon Press 2007) (1739). For a modern account couched in terms of game theory,
see SUGDEN, supra note 13.
17
See Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892) (and authorities cited).
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land from its previous owner, the parcel continues to belong to whoever
owned it before. By and large, however, the doctrine of avulsion, like the
doctrine of accretion, privileges the owner of existing solid land relative to
the owner of submerged land. Ownership of solid land, which typically has
been actively possessed, is not lost by sudden and perceptible acts of
nature. Nor does the owner of submerged land gain a windfall through such
events.
What about additions to solid land brought about by artificial filling?
Artificial filling is obviously different in important respects from changes
to the shoreline produced by Acts of God. Awarding title to artificially
filled land to the riparian owner would create a serious moral hazard.
Riparian owners would have a powerful incentive to augment their
holdings by filling, even at the expense of public rights in open waters and
free navigation. Consequently, courts have long assumed that riparian
owners who engage in deliberate filling of submerged land, or who erect
structures in the water that cause their land to be augmented by accretion,
cannot claim title to the new land.18
Who then owns artificially created land? The logic of the accretion–
avulsion distinction suggests that such land should belong to the owner of
the submerged land. If someone dumps enough dirt on submerged land to
cause it to turn to solid land, the change will be sudden and perceptible, and
thus should be classified as an avulsion. If such artificial avulsions are
treated like other avulsions for purposes of title, then title should remain as
it was before the change took place—that is, with the owner of the
submerged land. There is some authority supporting this analysis. In Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection,19 for example, the Supreme Court concluded that Florida law
could be construed as allowing the owner of submerged land (the State of
Florida, as it happened) to engage in artificial filling on submerged land to
create an expanded public beach, because this would be regarded under
Florida law as an artificial avulsion.20
Nevertheless, there are relatively few cases that explicitly treat
deliberate filling as an artificial avulsion.21 And the precedents that do exist,
including Stop the Beach, admit of unease about the result.22 Perhaps this is
because allowing the owner of the submerged land to engage in
unrestricted artificial filling as an incident of its ownership of such land
18

See, e.g., Lovingston v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 64 Ill. 56, 65 (1872), aff’d, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46
(1874) (riparian owner can claim accretions caused by erection of artificial structure, but only if the
structure was made by some third party on other land); Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, 466, 117 N.E.
123, 128 (1917) (to similar effect).
19
130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
20
See id. at 2611–12.
21
See 3 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2485–86 (1904).
22
See, e.g., 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (describing the result as “odd” and “counter-intuitive”).
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could interfere with public rights of navigation and fishing. And even if the
owner of the submerged land (commonly but not universally the state) is
mindful of public rights, filling submerged land can interfere with the
private rights of riparian owners by blocking access to the water or
impairing other riparian rights such as the right to view the water. Perhaps
in part for these reasons, the federal government—through the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers—has been given regulatory authority over any
dredging and filling of navigable waters; this authority acts as a trump of
state property rights in submerged land.23
As a matter of historical practice, the treatment of artificial filling has
been far from uniform or clear. We know that many states permitted or
even encouraged artificial filling and often awarded newly formed landfill
to abutting riparian owners.24 It is also probable that surreptitious filling has
been tolerated as a way of augmenting riparian land, if only because it is
difficult to detect and prevent. In short, although the logic of the common
law distinction between accretion and avulsion would seem to award title to
land created by artificial filling to the owner of the submerged land on
which the fill is placed, the actual treatment of such conduct has been
mixed, creating significant uncertainty about the legal status of artificially
filled land.
B. A Changing Baseline of Title to Submerged Land
The uncertainties that generally afflict reclaimed land were heightened
in Illinois in the late nineteenth century by shifting legal understandings
about who held legal title to the submerged land beneath Lake Michigan.
Here it is important to trace some background about the evolution of
American law concerning ownership of land under navigable waters.
In English law, an important distinction was maintained between
navigable and non-navigable waters. With respect to navigable waters, the
King was said to own the submerged lands, subject to the rights of all
subjects to navigate and to fish.25 In effect, the land was subject to a public
servitude for navigation and fishing. When the American colonies declared
their independence, they were held to succeed to the rights of the Crown in
23

See Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1344 (2006) (allowing the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Chief of Engineers, to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites”).
24
See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 44–68 (1983); TARLOCK, supra note 8,
§ 8:25, at 492–93.
25
See Lord Mathew Hale, De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS
RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND, FROM MANUSCRIPTS 5, 6–7 (Dublin, Francis Hargrave ed., 1787).
Technically, English law recognized only a presumption that lands beneath tidal waters belonged to the
King. If one could produce a written grant clearly conveying the land to a private party, the grant would
be upheld. In practice, this meant only that the land was not inalienable.
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this respect. So the state governments were deemed to own the lands
beneath navigable waters, again subject to the two historical public rights.26
In 1845, the Supreme Court held that newly formed states carved out of the
federal public domain were entitled to these same rights of ownership with
respect to submerged lands beneath navigable waters.27 This came to be
known as the “equal footing” doctrine: the new states stood on an equal
footing with the original states in terms of their ownership of submerged
lands.28
There was a complication. English law, at least as understood by
American commentators, defined “navigable waters” to mean waters
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.29 This made sense in the English
context, with its long coastline and short rivers, most of which were tidal in
the reaches where commercial traffic was important. So, in England, the
Crown was deemed to be the owner of submerged lands beneath tidal
waters—but submerged land under rivers, lakes, and ponds not washed by
the tides was owned by the abutting riparian landowner to the centerline of
the body of water.30 This set of understandings can be called the “English
rule” for ownership of submerged lands under non-navigable waters.31
America, unlike England, contained many long rivers and large
internal lakes that were not tidal and yet were critical to interstate
commerce. So the English definition of navigable waters did not make
sense in the American context. The Supreme Court eventually recognized
this: it held—initially only for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction—that
“navigable” in the United States means navigable in fact.32 The Court also
eventually held that “navigable” means navigable in fact for purposes of
the equal footing doctrine.33 But there was a wrinkle, and it was to
contribute to confusion over rights to submerged lands. With respect to
waters that were navigable in fact, the equal footing doctrine meant that
each state was free to decide for itself how to determine title to land

26

See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410–18 (1842).
See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29 (1845).
28
See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public
Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 34–36 (1997).
29
See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1083–90 (2002) (expressing some
skepticism about whether the American commentators got English law right).
30
See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATER-COURSES
14–18 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1824); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 528–29
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 9th ed. 1858).
31
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 828.
32
See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851).
33
See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435–37 (1892).
27
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beneath such waters.34 In effect, each state could choose whether to
embrace the English view of submerged land ownership with respect to
such lands or, instead, what could be called the American rule, which
awarded title to land under waters that were navigable in fact to the state
government.35
The resulting understanding of the equal footing doctrine has
generated a confusing pastiche of rules in the United States about who
owns submerged lands. The doctrine means, for example, that where a
navigable river forms the boundary between two states, the submerged land
on one side of the centerline of the river can belong to the state while on
the other side a private party owns title to the submerged land.36
Nor is there any requirement of internal consistency, as is illustrated
by the law in Illinois. The state courts in Illinois initially applied the
English rule to land beneath navigable rivers, including the Mississippi,
Ohio, and Chicago Rivers.37 Riparian owners whose land bordered Lake
Michigan had every reason to believe that the English rule for establishing
ownership of submerged land would apply to them, too. Although there
was no definitive decision to this effect, the behavior of legally advised
parties such as the City of Chicago and the Illinois Central Railroad was
consistent with this understanding.38 Starting in 1860, however, the Illinois
Supreme Court began inching toward the American rule, at least for Lake
Michigan and other large lakes. In that year, the court interpreted a deed
that described the boundary of property as “Lake Michigan” to mean that
ownership extended only to the edge of the lake.39 Soon, lawyers began
advising owners of riparian property on Lake Michigan that they had no
claim to the bed of the lake.40 For a time, it was unclear who did own it:
The federal government? The State? The unorganized public? Although the
result was foreshadowed in earlier federal decisions,41 it was not until 1896
that the Illinois Supreme Court definitively ruled that the State owned the

34

In other words, federal law controlled as to whether waters were navigable, but state law
controlled as to the ownership of submerged land under waters that were navigable. See Packer v. Bird,
137 U.S. 661, 666–70 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894).
35
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 828‒29.
36
See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 96, 98 (1984).
37
See Middleton v. Pritchard, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 510, 518–22 (1842) (a riparian owner on the
Mississippi holds title to the bed of the river to the centerline); Ensminger v. People, 47 Ill. 384, 388–92
(1868) (noting the same rule for the Ohio River); City of Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Ill. 172, 176 (1868)
(applying the same rule for the Chicago River).
38
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 830, 837.
39
See Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 525 (1860); see also Trs. of Sch. v. Schroll, 120 Ill. 509, 12
N.E. 243 (1887) (applying rule to a different lake).
40
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 833 n.153.
41
See, e.g., Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730, 755–57 (N.D. Ill. 1888), aff’d, 146 U.S. 387
(1892).
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land beneath Lake Michigan.42 In other words, Illinois eventually decided
to follow the English rule for rivers and the American rule for Lake
Michigan.
Whatever the merits and demerits of the state ownership doctrine,
adoption of this understanding of title unquestionably added to uncertainty
about who controls land created where water once stood. In previous
writing, we have described how the tectonic shift in Illinois law from the
English to the American rule with respect to title to the bed of Lake
Michigan unleashed intense competition to claim the submerged land on
the lakefront in Chicago. In the late 1860s, multiple groups attempted to
secure legislation from the State transferring ownership of the submerged
land to themselves, for purposes of constructing a new outer harbor in the
lake.43 The competition was won by the Illinois Central Railroad, which
secured such a grant in 1869, only to have it repealed in 1873.44 This led to
litigation that was resolved only in 1902.45 Later, the state legislature
authorized a massive project filling up the lakeshore in the area now known
as Grant Park.46 This gave rise to an epic struggle over whether the newly
created land would be used as a site for the construction of monumental
buildings or as open space free of any substantial structures—a struggle
that continues to this day.47 The reverberations from this shift in the law
also fueled the disputes over ownership of filled land in Streeterville.
C. The Weak State
A third factor that contributed to uncertainty about rights to filled land
was the weakness of the state as a political institution. Weak state
governments, such as Illinois in the late nineteenth century, could easily be
prevailed upon to convey rights to submerged lands.48 And when they
retained title, they were unable to assert effective control over such lands.
The states had no department of natural resources to monitor encroachment

42

See People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 145–47, 45 N.E. 830, 833 (1896) (State owns
the bed of Lake Michigan, distinguishing rule that applies to rivers); see also Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill.
462, 44 N.E. 286 (1896) (holding that riparian owner abutting Wolf Lake owned only to the shore, not
to the centerline).
43
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 842–53, 860–77.
44
See id. at 860–77, 905–12.
45
See id. at 912–24.
46
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1435–38.
47
See id. at 1470–1517.
48
See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 830, 837 (discussing conveyance by the State to the
Illinois Central Railroad); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1437–38, 1479–80 (discussing grants by
the State to the South Park Commissioners); infra Part VI (describing conveyance of submerged land by
the State to the Lincoln Park Commissioners and through them to private riparian owners).
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on submerged lands.49 All this, combined with legal uncertainty about
ownership and control over these lands, invited machinations by private
interests seeking to capture values associated with those lands.
The relative weakness of the state governments in controlling rights to
submerged lands is revealed by the evolution of another doctrine that
affected the use and control of submerged lands: the privilege of riparian
owners to “wharf out” to reach water deep enough to be accessible by boat.
If the English rule of title to nontidal submerged land applies, then
obviously a riparian owner can wharf out: such a riparian owner also owns
the submerged land, and, so long as the wharf (or pier or dock) does not
interfere with public rights of navigation, construction of the wharf is
unproblematic.50 The more difficult case is where the state owns the
submerged land—i.e., where the waters are tidal or are navigable in fact
and the American rule of ownership applies. In these circumstances, many
jurisdictions, following presumed English law, have held that a riparian
owner still has the right to wharf out to the navigable portion of the water,
provided that there is no interference with public navigation.51 This
understanding made sense at a time when the state was weak and there
were few public resources for the construction of wharfs and docks. Public
access to transportation by water, in such circumstances, required private
initiative. As government resources grew and governments increasingly
began to sponsor construction of public wharfs and piers, many
jurisdictions renounced the privilege to wharf out over publicly owned
submerged lands.52
The legal status of the wharfing-out privilege has always been unclear,
which has given rise to further uncertainties when the government has
moved to restrict the privilege. If the submerged land is owned by the state
as sovereign, then one view is that the privilege is a mere license, and,
under the doctrine of “purprestures,” the state can withdraw the privilege
for any reason, or no reason at all.53 Another view is that the privilege is a
species of riparian property rights and can be withdrawn only if the state
proves that the wharf or dock is a public nuisance.54 This would typically
49

Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 163–66 (1973) (describing the
weakness of state institutions during the nineteenth century and providing an example of an Illinois
ferry regulation that was left entirely to private citizens for its enforcement).
50
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Ill. 172 (1868).
51
See, e.g., Dutton v. Strong, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 23, 31–32 (1861); R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 272, 286–89 (1868); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870); see also 1
FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 533 (discussing doctrine).
52
See, e.g., Revell v. People, 177 Ill. 468, 486–89, 52 N.E. 1052, 1058–59 (1898); Oakland v.
E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16, 22–23, 292 P. 1076, 1078–79 (1930) (per curiam); see also
1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 544–45 (discussing Revell).
53
See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 541; Alfred E. McCordic & Wilson G. Crosby, The Right of
Access and the Right to Wharf Out to Navigable Water, 4 HARV. L. REV. 14, 19–21 (1890).
54
See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 537–39.
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entail a judicial finding that the wharf or dock interferes with rights
common to the general public, such as navigation or fishing. The
understanding of which rule applies has, once again, exhibited great
instability. For example, New York went from being a purpresture state to
being a public nuisance state, at roughly the same time that, in the late
nineteenth century, Illinois went from being a public nuisance state to
being a purpresture state.55 Most states today require a license from a
governmental agency to build and maintain a dock or wharf; this represents
a kind of intermediate position between the two polar positions that
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.56
In short, the inherent weakness of property rights in submerged land,
changing understandings about ownership of submerged land, and weak
state institutions all converged in nineteenth-century Illinois to create
conditions ripe for conflict among rival groups seeking to capture values
associated with filled land. This, as we shall see, is a one-sentence
explanation for what became the battle for Streeterville.
II. KINZIE’S ADDITION
Before Chicago became an organized community, it was a military fort
and trading post. Beginning in 1803, the military outpost, Fort Dearborn,
was located on the south bank of the Chicago River where Michigan
Avenue is located today. Across the river, on the north bank, was a small
farm and trading post belonging to one John Kinzie.57 Kinzie first came to
the area in 1804, left during the War of 1812 when the fort was burned (and
thirty-eight of its occupants were killed by Potawatomi Indians), and
returned in 1816, when the fort was rebuilt.58 In 1821, a certain John Wall
surveyed the area for the federal Public Land Office, following the
rectangular grid system established by the Land Ordinance of 1785.59
Wall’s hand-drawn map demarcated the area occupied by Kinzie’s farm as
north fractional section 10, township 39 North, range 14 East, of the third
principal meridian. He calculated that it contained 102.29 acres of land.60
55

Compare Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1908), with Revell,
177 Ill. 468, 52 N.E. 1052.
56
See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 550–51.
57
For a history of Chicago from its earliest beginnings, see ULRICH DANCKERS & JANE MEREDITH,
EARLY HISTORY OF CHICAGO (2000).
58
See ANNE DURKIN KEATING, RISING UP FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: THE BATTLE OF FORT
DEARBORN AND THE BIRTH OF CHICAGO 68–70, 146–50, 170–72, 187–88, 191–92, 209–22 (2012)
(recounting Kinzie’s story in detail).
59
See PAYSON JACKSON TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM: 1785–1820, at 179–97 (1910)
(providing a detailed examination of the Land Ordinance of 1785); see also BILL HUBBARD JR.,
AMERICAN BOUNDARIES: THE NATION, THE STATES, THE RECTANGULAR SURVEY 183–214 (2009)
(summarizing the rectangular survey system in the Ordinance).
60
See Edward O. Brown, The Shore of Lake Michigan, A Paper Read Before the Law Club of the
City of Chicago 7–8 (Apr. 25, 1902) (recounting Wall’s survey). To view the survey itself, see Before
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FIGURE 1: KINZIE’S CABIN61

In 1831, Robert A. Kinzie, John’s son, applied at the Land Office to
make an entry on north fractional section 10 under the preemption acts,
paying the statutory rate of $1.25 per acre.62 Two years later, the younger
Kinzie subdivided the tract into lots and blocks and recorded a plat that
came to be known as “Kinzie’s Addition” to the City of Chicago.63 The
land so subdivided was bounded on the south by the Chicago River, on the
east by Lake Michigan, on the west by Wolcott Street (which would later
become State Street), and on the north by what would become Chicago
Avenue. The street running north and south nearest the lake was called
“Sand Street” (later renamed St. Clair Street); at approximately Huron
Street (to the north) the shore of the lake bent to the west, at which point
(largely between Huron and Superior streets and altogether before Chicago
Avenue) Sand Street was cut off by the water.64 In 1837, the United States
issued Robert Kinzie a patent conferring fee simple title to the tract and
noting the acreage as stated on the 1821 survey.

the Canal: Early History, BRIDGEPORT, https://www.uic.edu/orgs/LockZero/I.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2013) [hereinafter Wall Survey].
61
On file with the Chicago History Museum DN-0001288.
62
See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 457 (1898).
63
See Kinzie v. Winston, 56 Ill. 56, 59 (1870).
64
See id. at 59–60; infra Figures 3, 6.
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FIGURE 2: CHICAGO, INCLUDING KINZIE’S ADDITION (1834)65

65

On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-37308. Kinzie’s Addition is the platted land in
the upper right-hand corner of the map.
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FIGURE 3: KINZIE’S ADDITION (1833)66

66

Photograph courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago, Call No. map4F G4104 .C6A 18– .C6
2010, sheet 5 of 8 (PrCt).
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The natural barrier on the southern edge of Kinzie’s Addition, the
Chicago River, was long recognized as having great potential as a port. It
was, however, unusable for navigation in its natural state: a sand bar at its
mouth caused the river to curve south and made the entrance too shallow
for the ships that plied the Great Lakes.67 In 1833 and 1834, soldiers
stationed at Fort Dearborn built piers on the north and south banks of the
river, directing its flow straight into Lake Michigan. This alteration,
supplemented by periodic dredging, turned the river into a functional port.68
Chicago soon began its phenomenal growth as a city. Real estate values,
including those in Kinzie’s Addition, rose dramatically, punctuated by
occasional downturns during times of financial distress.69
The current in the southern part of Lake Michigan generally moves in
a counterclockwise direction.70 Though not anticipated when the mouth of
the river was straightened by piers, this was to have a profound effect on
the riparian lands to the immediate south and north. South of the river, the
current caused irregular but persistent erosion of the shore. By the 1840s,
the area then known as Lake Park (Grant Park today) had nearly washed
away, and Michigan Avenue was in danger of collapsing into the lake.71
After much wrangling, a solution was reached when the Illinois Central
Railroad agreed to construct its rail line entering the City on piers in the
lake, with a breakwater just outside the right of way, thereby protecting the
shore against further erosion.72
North of the river, the counterclockwise current generally led to
accretion rather than erosion. As early as 1837, a chart labeled “Cap.
Allen’s Map” (Figure 4 below), which was evidently prepared by an officer
stationed at Fort Dearborn, indicated that the shoreline north of the river
had moved outward into the lake from where it stood when the “work was
commenced” (i.e., when the straightening of the river had occurred).73 The
chart showed in this area two additional sandbars forming farther offshore,
on a diagonal line running from the northwest to the southeast. The 1840s
saw further accretion, so that soon an estimated 1200 feet of new land had
augmented the original subdivision to the east of Sand Street. It was a gift
of nature—new solid land formed on what had once been submerged land.

67

See HAROLD M. MAYER, THE PORT OF CHICAGO AND THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY 9–11 (1957);
supra Figure 2.
68
See MAYER, supra note 67, at 10–11.
69
See HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO 33–37 (Beard Books
2000) (1933).
70
See DOUGLAS SCHROEDER, THE ISSUE OF THE LAKEFRONT: AN HISTORICAL CRITICAL SURVEY 2
(1964).
71
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1428–29.
72
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 817–20.
73
HAROLD M. MAYER & RICHARD C. WADE, CHICAGO: GROWTH OF A METROPOLIS 16 fig.1
(1969).
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It was not long before legal maneuvering broke out over who had the right
to capture the economic value associated with this new land.
FIGURE 4: CAP. ALLEN’S MAP (1837)74

As we have seen, the doctrine of accretion provides that gradual and
imperceptible deposits of new soil belong to the owner of the riparian land
to which the soil attaches. Early decisions of the Illinois courts followed
this recognized doctrine.75 The idea sounds straightforward in principle, but
the disputes over Kinzie’s Addition suggest its application in practice to be
anything but easy.
The first recorded dispute was between the United States government
and Kinzie together with his grantees. The original shoreline of Kinzie’s
Addition (shown in Figures 2 and 3 above) ran due south, forming a right
angle when the north pier extended the Chicago River into the lake on a
74

On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-67019.
See, e.g., Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29 (1850); Lovingston v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 64 Ill. 56
(1872), aff’d, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
75

1074

107:1057 (2013)

The Battle for Streeterville

straighter line to the east (shown in Figure 4 above) than had been the case
originally. The accretion, however, ran roughly on a diagonal line between
the arms of this right angle (see Figure 4). Who then was the relevant
riparian owner entitled to the new land—the private owners of land on the
north–south arm or the federal government (as custodian of the pier) on the
east–west arm? In 1850, the U.S. Attorney General gave a legal opinion
that the United States, as the entity that had constructed and maintained the
north pier, was entitled to claim the accretion as newly formed government
land.76 This legal reasoning seems doubtful: it was far from clear at the time
that the United States retained title to the submerged land on which the pier
was built (and indeed later, when the equal footing doctrine was extended
to the Great Lakes, the courts established that the State of Illinois was the
owner of the submerged land77). No attempt was made by federal
authorities in the aftermath of this opinion to assert control over the
accreted lands. And no court ever endorsed the Attorney General’s theory.78
Although accretion was well underway by 1850, it was some time
before the first reported judicial controversy over rights to the new land
appeared. The explanation may be that the accreted lands—which were
nicknamed “the Sands”—became Chicago’s premier vice district.79 The
Chicago Tribune described the area as “the vilest and most dangerous place
in Chicago,” “the resort and hiding place of all sorts of criminals, [where]
the most wretched and degraded women and their miserable pimps[]
congregated.”80 Before owners of lots in Kinzie’s Addition could consider
developing the new land, these inhabitants had to be removed. On April 20,
1857, after years of failed attempts, the deputy sheriff and thirty policemen,
led by Mayor “Long John” Wentworth, delivered writs of ejection and tore
down nine makeshift buildings.81

76

See Accretion at the Mouth of the Chicago River, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 264 (1850).
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 833.
78
Which is not to say the federal rights theory went away. Much later, after controversies erupted
over claims filed with federal authorities for private patents to additional reclaimed land in the area, the
1850 opinion was “the subject of grave comment and argument” among federal officials. Brown, supra
note 60, at 10.
79
See LIBBY HILL, THE CHICAGO RIVER: A NATURAL AND UNNATURAL HISTORY 80 (2000)
(describing the “notorious reputation” of the area).
80
The Dens in the Sands Broken Up: Nine Buildings Torn Down and Six Burned, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
21, 1857, at 1.
81
See id. The details of exactly how Wentworth carried out this raid are disputed. See JOHN J.
FLINN & JOHN E. WILKIE, HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO POLICE: FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
COMMUNITY TO THE PRESENT TIME 82 (Chicago, Police Book Fund 1887) (explaining that “[i]t would
be impossible to extract from the variety of accounts one that would stand the test of investigation” and
concluding that the Chicago Tribune article, cited here in note 80, is the most accurate). Urban legend
has it that Mayor Wentworth arranged a dogfight or horse race outside of the City in order to lure the
male population away from the Sands on the day of the raid. See id. at 83; Kendall, The Sands, CHI.
CRIME SCENES PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2008, 11:13 PM), http://chicagocrimescenes.blogspot.com/2008/12/
77
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FIGURE 5: 1853 BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF CHICAGO82

Whether or not the Wentworth raid put an end to vice in the area,
enough respectability was established to convince owners with land titles in
Kinzie’s Addition to begin attending to the development potential of the
land. The Ogden and McCormick families, owners of land in Kinzie’s
Addition just north of the Chicago River, formed an entity called the
Chicago Dock and Canal Company, which obtained a special charter from
the State in 1857.83 The charter broadly authorized the company to
construct on its own lands “and on the shore and in the navigable waters of
Lake Michigan” various wharfs and docks “for the safety and
accommodation of boats and vessels.”84 The firm eventually filled in the
area north of the north pier, for a distance of a half-mile farther east into the
lake, where it constructed a long slip parallel to the river called the
Michigan Canal. (This still exists today, being known as the “Ogden
Slip.”85) Like the extensive landfills of the Illinois Central south of the
river, this massive landfill could arguably be justified under the wharfingout privilege, on the ground that it was necessary to create the new slip and
sands.html. While no official report has ever confirmed this account, Mayor Wentworth “never denied
that the story was well founded.” FLINN & WILKIE, supra, at 83.
82
On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-38871 (showing, to the right of the river, Sand
Street, later renamed St. Clair Street, running north and south nearest Lake Michigan). Cf. infra Figure
6 (also showing Sand Street).
83
See 1857 Ill. Laws 499.
84
Id. § 4.
85
See MAYER, supra note 67, at 10–12.
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associated docking facilities. The new canal and wharf unquestionably
accelerated the accretion occurring farther to the north.86
FIGURE 6: ILLUSTRATION FROM BANKS V. OGDEN (1864)87

86

See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE,
H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 2, at 201–05 (Ill. 1911).
87
Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 59 (1864).
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Soon, various owners began investing in litigation to secure title to the
new land formed by the accretion. At least seven controversies involving
claims of accretion in “the Sands” are memorialized in published appellate
opinions starting in the 1850s, including four opinions of the U.S. Supreme
Court. One dispute arose from the fact that Water Street ran at an angle,
making it difficult to identify which lot was entitled to the alluvial
formations.88 Another sprang up when the straightening of the Chicago
River relocated some lots originally in Kinzie’s Addition to the south side
of the river.89 Others were created by Robert Kinzie’s 1842 bankruptcy:
some of his creditors claimed that they were entitled to seize, as part of the
debtor’s estate, accreted lands that formed after the bankruptcy.90 Even
further problems were created when Robert Kinzie’s widow claimed dower
rights in lands that formed after his death.91
The most consequential dispute, in terms of future conflicts, concerned
the legal significance of Sand Street, standing between the original
subdivision and much of the newly formed land to the east (see Figure 6).
If Kinzie had made a statutory dedication of the street, then under Illinois
law the City of Chicago would hold fee simple title to the street, making
the City the riparian owner entitled to all the newly formed land to the
east.92 But Kinzie’s assignees argued, and the courts agreed, that Kinzie’s
recordation of the subdivision occurred before Illinois had established its
procedure for statutory dedications.93 Consequently, Sand Street was a
common law dedication, which meant the public had only an easement in
the street.94 The fee remained with the dedicator, Kinzie, and passed to his
assignees.95 This meant that owners of land on Sand (St. Clair) Street could
claim, as riparian owners, title to accretions that formed to the east.
Litigation over accretions in Kinzie’s Addition persisted until 1879.
Cumulatively, the decisions reveal a distinct preference for private
ownership of accreted lands, perhaps because commercial development
was assumed to be the preferred use for the land in question. The initial
cases assume that the accretion was not the intended consequence of any
deliberate human intervention. The last reported opinion, however, notes in
passing that the accretions had created a half mile of new land, “partly by

88

See Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150 (1855); Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 209
(1861).
89
See Bates v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 204 (1861).
90
See Kinzie v. Winston, 14 F. Cas. 649 (Cook Cnty., Ill. Cir. Ct.) (No. 7,835), aff’d, 56 Ill. 56
(1870).
91
See Chi. Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 Ill. 289 (1868); Lombard v. Kinzie, 73 Ill. 446 (1874).
92
On the distinction between statutory and common law dedication, see Kearney & Merrill, supra
note 4, at 1444 n.139.
93
See Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 61–63, 67–68 (1864).
94
See id. at 68.
95
See id. at 68–69.
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natural causes and partly by artificial means.”96 This was an oblique
acknowledgment that the efforts of Mother Nature had been augmented by
the shovel. As Secretary of the Interior Cornelius Bliss observed later, the
land had been created “at first by way of natural accretion which was
afterwards accelerated by the building of piers into the lake and by the
dumpage of refuse from the city.”97
III. ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ACRES OF VACANT LAND
In the 1880s, litigation over accretion came to an end and was replaced
by largely extrajudicial schemes to obtain rights to the newly formed land
east of the original Kinzie’s Addition. Although the cause of this shift in
the mode of conflict cannot be determined with complete confidence, the
root source, we believe, was mounting uncertainty over the legal status of
the new land.
One reason litigation over accretion stopped is that natural accretion
was largely supplanted by artificial landfilling. All structures in Kinzie’s
Addition burned to the ground in the great Chicago Fire of 1871.98 We
know that a great quantity of rubble from the fire was dumped into the lake
in the area, south of the river, just east of downtown Chicago.99 Although
there is no documented evidence that rubble from structures in Kinzie’s
Addition was likewise dumped into the lake in the area to the immediate
east, it is probable that at least some dumping occurred here, if only to save
the expense of carting it across the river to Lake Park.
It is also likely that artificial fill was deliberately used to augment the
extent of the solid land. Recall that Illinois adopted the English rule for
determining ownership of submerged land in the early nineteenth century,
which assigned ownership of the bed of Lake Michigan to abutting riparian
owners. This undoubtedly emboldened some riparian owners in Kinzie’s
Addition to fill in submerged land they thought they owned.100 After 1860,
it appeared increasingly likely that the Illinois courts would hold that the

96

Chi. Dock & Canal Co. v. Kinzie, 93 Ill. 415, 426–28 (1879).
Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 458 (1898).
98
See MAYER & WADE, supra note 73, at 108 fig.1 (map showing the area destroyed by the great
fire of 1871). During the fire, the Sands served as a refuge for thousands of Chicagoans fleeing the
flames of the City and carrying whatever possessions they could hold. HERMAN KOGAN & ROBERT
CROMIE, THE GREAT FIRE: CHICAGO 1871, at 99 (1971). As the fire raged on and the heat became
unbearable, many of those taking refuge had to take to the shallow waters. Id.
99
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 899.
100
As one of the lawyers for the Lincoln Park Commissioners would later remark, “This accretion
had been in the main natural, but at various points had been undoubtedly artificially aided by the shore
owners who (some of them at least) thought and had been advised that they were entitled to reclaim
land from the lake without limit, save as to the risk of interfering with navigable water.” Brown, supra
note 60, at 10.
97
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State owned the submerged land under the lake.101 Under standard riparian
rights law, this would mean that any land created by artificial dumping
belonged to the State.102 In any event, given the mounting uncertainty about
ownership of artificial landfill, a riparian owner would be unlikely to build
valuable structures or make other significant improvements on such land.
FIGURE 7: ROBINSON’S ATLAS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO (1886)103

It is instructive to consider what the land north of the Chicago River
and east of Pine Street (today Michigan Avenue) looked like in the 1880s,
before the era of extrajudicial competition began. Fortunately, we have a
source, Robinson’s Atlas of the City of Chicago, which shows—in detail, as
seen in Figure 7—solid land, subdivision lines, and structures as of 1886.
The atlas reveals, first, that the shoreline had moved dramatically to the
east, relative to what was shown by the original Wall survey of 1821 or
101

Cf. Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462, 474–87, 44 N.E. 286, 290–95 (1896) (reviewing evolving
jurisprudence from 1860 to 1896 on ownership of lakebeds).
102
See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
103
3 E. ROBINSON, ROBINSON’S ATLAS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO plate 11 (New York 1886),
available at http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/11064.html.
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even as suggested by the accretion cases of the 1860s and 1870s. Between
the Chicago River and Illinois Street, the map shows solid land extending
all the way to the east end of the north pier of the river. This was the
location of the Michigan Canal previously mentioned. At Illinois Street, the
shoreline retreats on a straight line sharply to the west. It then proceeds on
a diagonal line to the northwest, to Superior Street, where it straightens out
and heads due north again to Pearson Street (beyond the margin of
Figure 7), where it again moves west. After that, the shoreline again
straightens out and continues in a northerly direction to Oak Street, where
Lake Shore Drive commences at the end of Pine Street and runs along the
shoreline. In short, an extensive landmass, later calculated to be 160
acres,104 had been formed between the river and Pearson Street, east of the
original boundary of Kinzie’s Addition.
FIGURE 8: LILL’S CHICAGO BREWING FROM ROBINSON’S (1886)105

104

This was the number of acres cited in a survey conducted by Interior Department officials in
1896. See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 457 (1898). Although the survey was
later annulled, see infra text accompanying notes 178–82, it was conducted by professionals and
presumably accurate. Different acreage numbers are cited in other sources.
105
ROBINSON, supra note 103.
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More striking yet is the dearth of buildings in this area of newly
formed land. Even the area in Figure 7 closest to the river has surprisingly
few commercial structures and no houses. Most of the blocks had been
subdivided into lots, but not all. All of the area between Indiana (now
Grand) and Ohio remained vacant of lots, as were the eastern portion of the
area between Ontario and Erie, both sides of Huron Street, and the area
between Chicago and Pearson, among others. Even the areas that had been
subdivided showed few or no structures. For example, as can be seen in
Figure 8, the area south of Chicago Avenue, now occupied by
Northwestern University, is shown as “Lills Chicago Brewing Cos. Sub.”
But there is only one small structure shown in the subdivision. In contrast,
the land on Pine Street and on both sides of St. Clair was relatively full of
structures. These areas, mostly just outside Figure 7, were, of course, part
of the original Kinzie’s Addition: title there was secure.
IV. THE DEESTRICT OF LAKE MICHIGAN
In the late 1880s, rather suddenly and simultaneously, four separate
efforts were launched to gain title to the largely vacant land east of St. Clair
Street (as Sand Street had been renamed before the Chicago Fire). As
Edward O. Brown, a Chicago attorney who left the best eyewitness account
of these struggles,106 would write:
This large tract of land, situated in such an excellent portion of the city for
residence property, but entirely unimproved, and for the time a mere barren
waste, seemed to dazzle the eyes of various adventurers and speculators.
It seemed to them that it must be a sort of no-man’s land, teeming with
potential wealth beyond the dreams of avarice.107

Success would ultimately go to a group that we shall call the “St. Clair
Street owners,” holders of property whose title traced to Kinzie’s original
patent. We discuss their efforts in Part VI, but the story lies substantially in
unsuccessful efforts, one of which we discuss here and the others in Part V.
The most famous campaign—and the most persistent—was that of the
legendary George Wellington Streeter, who is memorialized by a life-sized
bronze statue at the intersection of Grand Avenue and McClurg Court, and
for whom the area is now named.
106

Brown came to Chicago in 1872, where he established the firm Peckham & Brown. See Walter
Nugent, A Catholic Progressive? The Case of Judge E.O. Brown, 2 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE
ERA 5, 12–13 (2003). Later he was appointed chief attorney for the Lincoln Park Board of
Commissioners, where he participated in suppressing the McKee scrip conspiracy and in facilitating the
Lake Shore Drive extension on behalf of the St. Clair Street riparian owners. See id. at 12, 16–17. He
delivered a lengthy address to the Law Club of the City of Chicago in 1902 recounting his version of
these events, supra note 60, which is an invaluable source. Later he was elected a judge of the Superior
Court of Cook County in 1903 and then appointed to the appellate division in 1904. See Nugent, supra,
at 33–34.
107
Brown, supra note 60, at 19.

1082

107:1057 (2013)

The Battle for Streeterville

Streeter’s career has been well documented, and we will not attempt to
offer a comprehensive account here.108 Streeter was the quintessential
scoundrel—profane, pugilistic, a braggart, and contemptuous of all
authority. He was also a showman and a con artist.109 He made, as more
than one observer noted, good newspaper copy.110 He knew enough law to
forge legal documents and defend himself in numerous trials, often
successfully. There is no evidence that he understood the legal intricacies
presented by property rights in submerged land. He had, however, an
intuitive appreciation of how the legal uncertainties associated with that
resource afflicted others. This he exploited with great skill.
Streeter’s story, as recounted in an autobiographical book published by
E.G. Ballard in 1914,111 starts in the summer of 1886 when he and his
second wife, Maria, outfitted a vessel named the Reutan to see whether it
was fit to transport guns to rebels in Honduras.112 Returning to Chicago
from a trial run to Milwaukee, Streeter and Maria encountered a sudden
gale that caused the Reutan to ground on a sandbar off the shore near
Superior Street.113 They decided to stay put, and an island soon formed
around the boat, augmented by fill obtained from contractors.114 For years,
Streeter and Maria continued to live on the Reutan and fill in the
submerged land around it.115 By 1893, as Streeter later boasted in his
autobiography, “I had filled in all of the space between my boat and the
shore to the west and south, and much farther to the northward”—
altogether, he claimed, “a territory of one hundred and eighty-six acres.”116
Streeter proclaimed the new land “The Deestrict of Lake Michigan,”
asserted that it was an independent nation—or at least independent of the
108

A recent retelling, which does much to sort out fact from fiction, is WAYNE KLATT, KING OF
GOLD COAST: CAP’N STREETER, THE MILLIONAIRES, AND THE STORY OF LAKE SHORE DRIVE
(2011).
109
In 1902, shortly after he was acquitted of murder by a hung jury, Streeter starred in a one-act
play at the Chicago Metropolitan Theater, which depicted him as an American patriot and the Chicago
police as acting on behalf of wealthy capitalists bent on destroying the American pioneer tradition. See
Joshua Salzmann, The Chicago Lakefront’s Last Frontier: The Turnerian Mythology of Streeterville,
1886–1961, 9 J. ILL. HIST. 201, 210–11 (2006). In the final scene, Streeter stood on stage while a giant
American flag unfurled overhead. Id.
110
See, e.g., id. In later litigation with the publisher of his autobiography, see infra note 111,
testimony was offered that a manuscript based on Streeter’s life would be a “good seller.” Affidavit of
Oscar Doering at 2, Streeter v. Ballard, No. B3224 (Cook Cnty., Ill. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1914).
111
EVERETT GUY BALLARD, CAPTAIN STREETER: PIONEER (1914). This book, which was based on
interviews conducted with Streeter, is written in the first person as if it were an autobiography. See
Kenneth F. Broomell & Harlow M. Church, Streeterville Saga, 33 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 153, 165
(1940).
112
See BALLARD, supra note 111, at 214–15.
113
See id.
114
See id. at 217–20.
115
See id. at 218–19.
116
Id. at 220.
THE
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State of Illinois (the claim varied)—and had himself “elected” leader of this
new “district” by an entourage of scruffy followers.117
FIGURE 9: STREETER’S “FORT” (1892)118

As suggested by this tale, which was mostly false,119 Streeter initially
claimed the land east of Kinzie’s Addition by right of original discovery
augmented by creation. He claimed to be the one who first discovered the
land, which had emerged from the lakebed, and the one who labored to
extend the land into a large tract of open space. Streeter undoubtedly
contributed to, or at least invited, further artificial filling of the submerged
land. But there is no way he was responsible for all of it. As discussed
above, most of the land was created by natural accretion, augmented by
artificial filling that occurred before Streeter arrived and later by the filling

117

See, e.g., Bill of Complaint of George Wellington Streeter at 8–12, Streeter v. Healy (Cook
Cnty., Ill. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1901).
118
On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-19835.
119
A more plausible version, which came out in a later fraud trial, is that Streeter’s boat was
intentionally grounded on a calm summer evening, and he was allowed to leave it on dry land by
Nathaniel K. Fairbank, arguably the riparian owner. Streeter then overstayed his welcome and became a
squatter. See Salzmann, supra note 109, at 207–08.
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performed by the Lincoln Park Commissioners in building the Lake Shore
Drive extension after 1891.120
Later, perhaps in emulation of rival claimants, Streeter developed an
alternative theory of title. It was based on the Wall survey of 1821, which
had been used to establish the original Kinzie’s Addition.121 He claimed
that the line on the map demarcating the shore of Lake Michigan was not a
meander line but rather a boundary line.122 Meander lines were established
by surveyors along the edge of bodies of water for purposes of ascertaining
the quantity of land available for sale.123 They were understood to be
subject to revision in later litigation when the exact boundary would be
established, depending on the facts on the ground, the applicable state law
about who owned submerged land, and where the legal line of division
between public and private ownership was located. Boundary lines, in
contrast, were understood to be fixed delimitations of property rights
established by survey, as under a metes-and-bounds survey system.124 If the
shoreline was a meander line, then Kinzie’s patent would include the right
to claim as property subsequent accretions. If it was a boundary line, then
the accretions would arguably be part of the public domain open for
claiming.
Relying on the theory that Wall’s survey had established a boundary
line, Streeter applied in 1895 for a patent on the “unclaimed” land outside
Kinzie’s Addition, invoking Maria’s status as the widow of a Civil War
veteran.125 His application was rejected by the Land Office on the ground
that the lands east of St. Clair Street “do not belong to the government, and,
therefore, this Department has no jurisdiction to direct their survey or
disposal.”126

120

See id. (citing John W. Stamper, Shaping Chicago’s Shoreline, 14 CHI. HIST. 44, 51–53 (1985–

86)).

121
122
123

See Wall Survey, supra note 60.
See Bill of Complaint of George Wellington Streeter, supra note 117, at 8.
See, e.g., R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371

(1891).
124

On the distinction of meander lines from boundaries, see WALTER G. ROBILLARD ET AL.,
BROWN’S BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES § 9.14, at 254 (6th ed. 2009).
125
KLATT, supra note 108, at 31. Congress had granted Civil War veterans and widows certain
homestead rights involving public lands. See generally PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW
COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 281–83 (1968) (providing an overview of the
congressional scheme and its implementation).
126
George W. Streeter et al., 21 Pub. Lands Dec. 131, 133 (1895).
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FIGURE 10: STREETER’S ADVERTISING MAP (CA. 1903)127

This led to Streeter’s third device for claiming the land: he and two
collaborators secured a copy of the original Kinzie patent, used acid to
remove the original signatures and land description, and forged the
necessary signatures and information to make it appear that Streeter had a
valid federal patent to the land.128 Before the forgery was exposed, Streeter
managed to secure an abstract of title from a title company and convinced
Rascher’s Insurance Co. to publish a map showing a portion of the area as
“Streeter’s land.”129
127

On file with the Chicago Public Library, Special Collections and Preservation Division, STR
Box 1, Folder 43.
128
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 70; Brown, supra note 60, at 32–33; Salzmann, supra note 109,
at 208; True Bills for Capt. Streeter, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1902, at 3.
129
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 45–46.
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As he shifted back and forth from one theory to another, Streeter
intuitively perceived that any claim of title would be strengthened, certainly
in a psychological if not a legal sense, if he were in actual possession of
some part of the land. Like the seafaring explorers of the sixteenth century,
Streeter felt that it was imperative to plant a flag in the soil marking his
“discovery” of the contested land. This explains his dogged efforts from
1886 to 1915 to maintain a foothold on some portion of the contested
terrain. Whether it was the grounded Reutan, a makeshift fortress (see
Figure 9 above), a tent, a shack, a boat club house, a broken-down
omnibus, or a small brick building, Streeter nearly always sought to
maintain some physical presence on the land.130 The principal exceptions
were when he was in jail or when others in league with him maintained a
presence on the land, allowing him to live elsewhere.
FIGURE 11: STREETER AND “MA”131

Streeter’s efforts to maintain a foothold on the land were greatly
assisted by the half-hearted attempts of the St. Clair Street owners to evict
him. Nathaniel K. Fairbank, who had accumulated a fortune by processing
lard and making soap and owned land on St. Clair between Huron and
130

See Saga of Streeterville—A Forty Year Real Estate War: Picturesque Squatter’s Futile Fight,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1937, at E1.
131
On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-12593.
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Superior streets, set the pattern here.132 He obtained an order of forcible
entry and detainer against Streeter sometime after the Reutan beached but
failed to enforce it before Streeter succeeded in tying the matter up in
litigation.133 Periodically, one or more owners would persuade the police to
intervene or would hire private “detectives” to attempt to evict Streeter and
his cohorts.134 Most of these attempts were rebuffed by a show of force by
Streeter and Maria, and later by Streeter and his fourth wife,135 “Ma”
Streeter (pictured in Figure 11 above).136 On several occasions, Streeter was
forced to retreat, but he always came back, by land or water.
The most serious episode occurred in 1902, when a young guard hired
by an attorney for the St. Clair Street owners was shot and killed in a gun
battle with Streeter’s gang.137 Streeter was indicted for murder.138 His first
trial, in which he defended himself, ended with a hung jury; the second
resulted in a manslaughter conviction. After spending less than a year in the
Joliet state penitentiary, Streeter was released by a sympathetic judge.139
What was Streeter’s objective in all this? There are occasional
suggestions that he wanted to make a pest of himself to the St. Clair Street
owners, whom he called “the millionaires,” in an attempt to get them to buy
him off.140 He was certainly a pest, but there is no indication that he ever
extracted an offer of payment in return for forfeiting his “claim.” More
obviously, Streeter made a living by duping unsophisticated real estate
investors into buying deeds to lots in his District of Lake Michigan. At the
peak of his success, before the forged deed was exposed, he sold lots out of
132

See KLATT, supra note 108, at 61; Salzmann, supra note 109, at 206–07.
See Fairbank v. Streeter, 142 Ill. 226, 31 N.E. 494 (1892); He Stands by the Ship, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 10, 1890, at 1.
134
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 68–69; K.C. Tessendorf, Captain Streeter’s District of Lake
Michigan, 5 CHI. HIST. 152, 157 (1976); The Fall of Streeterville: The Wounded, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15,
1915, at 2. The “hired tools,” it was said, would stand watch around the clock and, taking advantage of
Streeter’s inability to guard each of his two habitations and boathouse simultaneously, would routinely
cast possessions, such as Streeter’s piano and furniture, from the property at times of Streeter’s absence.
BALLARD, supra note 111, at 232–35.
135
There is significant confusion about Streeter’s various marriages and their status. KLATT, supra
note 108, seems to have sorted most of it out. Streeter’s first wife, Minnie, ran away to join a vaudeville
troop, likely without obtaining a divorce. See id. at 38. His second wife, Maria, died of injuries
sustained in falling off a streetcar in 1903. See id. at 102. He was then married for about one month to a
young girl of fifteen or sixteen named Mary Collins, who evidently believed Streeter’s claim that his
land was worth millions. See id. at 103. She left him without seeking a divorce. Id. at 104. He then
married Elma, or “Ma.” See id. at 38.
136
See ‘Ma’ Streeter Fights On as the ‘Cap’n’ Dies, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1921, at 3. None of
Streeter’s partners shied away from battle. For example, during a forceful attempt to oust Streeter and
Maria from their lakefront home, she poured a pot of boiling water on five intruders, ending the battle.
See id.
137
See District Battle Ends in Murder, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1902, at 1.
138
See id.; Lay Murder to Streeter, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1902, at 1.
139
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 101–03.
140
See Salzmann, supra note 109, at 207–08.
133
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a parlor in the Tremont Hotel.141 One newspaper estimated that he had
received $100,000 in his nearly thirty-year career of engaging in sham land
transactions.142
There are two striking facts about Streeter’s marathon career as a
squatter. First, there is no publicly reported judicial decision holding him
guilty of trespass. We know of at least two forcible entry and detainer
actions—a statutory cause of action that presupposes the defendant to be in
wrongful possession—brought by St. Clair owners against Streeter. The
first, filed by Fairbank in 1890, resulted in a victory for Fairbank in the
local justice court but was reversed on appeal by the Cook County Superior
Court, where Streeter raised the defense that Fairbank’s riparian rights
included only natural accretion and not artificial landfilling.143 Fairbank
eventually got the original judgment reinstated by the Illinois Supreme
Court, but on the hypertechnicality that the wrong judge had set the appeal
bond.144 The second was filed in 1901 by Louisa Healy, the widow of
portrait artist George Healy, who claimed an interest in land between
Pearson and Walton streets.145 This resulted in an elaborate trial and a
victory for Healy in the superior court, but the decision rested heavily on
the determination that Streeter had been present on the land less than one
year.146 There was no appeal. There were numerous other legal actions
against, and sometimes by, Streeter, but they involved ancillary issues such
as fraud, assault, murder, or selling liquor on Sundays.147 None of these
proceedings brought the title of the St. Clair Street owners into question.
It is probably no coincidence that the St. Clair owners avoided a
definitive judicial determination of their title in the long-running battle with
Streeter. Fear of popular sympathy for the wily scoundrel may have been
one reason. But a more likely explanation is that their title was doubtful—
at least over much of the land in question. Streeter was correct in his
defense against Fairbank, although he did not have a complete command of
all the authorities that would confirm he was right. If the artificial filling of
submerged land to which the State of Illinois had never given its consent
had formed the ground that Streeter was occupying, then the State was the
only authority that could evict him, not the St. Clair owners.148

141

See id. at 207.
See Chicago’s ‘Oasis’ Raided by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1915, at 8.
143
See He Is a Modern Crusoe, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1891, at 9.
144
See Fairbank v. Streeter, 142 Ill. 226, 31 N.E. 494 (1892).
145
See Healy v. Streeter, No. 217933 (Cook Cnty., Ill. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 1901).
146
See id.
147
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 94 (fraud trial); id. at 100 (assault); id. at 99–102 (murder); id. at
115 (selling liquor on Sunday).
148
See supra text accompanying notes 98–100 (describing the artificial filling that followed the
Chicago Fire).
142
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The second striking fact about Streeter’s long career is that the State of
Illinois showed no interest in his agitation. This was so even though it
became increasingly clear that the State held title to the submerged land out
of which Streeter’s “island” and the associated landfilling had allegedly
emerged. Streeter had his run-ins with the Chicago police, and he fought
pitched battles with private security guards hired by the St. Clair Street
owners. But the State of Illinois was entirely absent from the scene. This
underscores the weakness of the State as an institution at the time. The
emerging legal consensus that the State owned the land sounded nice in
theory, but in practice it was little different from saying that it was owned
by no one at all.
V. THE MCKEE SCRIP AND POTAWATOMI CLAIMS
Captain Streeter was not the only one maneuvering to obtain property
rights in the vacant land east of Kinzie’s Addition. Other, more
professional attempts—one involving veterans’ rights and the other an
Indian tribe—were afoot as well. Because they were more professional,
they were more threatening to the St. Clair Street owners.
A. The McKee Scrip Claim
William R. McKee, a colonel with the Second Regiment Kentucky
Volunteers, was killed in action during the Battle of Buena Vista in the
War with Mexico.149 In 1853, Congress enacted a private bill awarding each
of his orphaned children a quarter section of land “to be located upon any
vacant land of the United States.”150 As frequently happened in such cases,
the McKee children sold their rights for cash.151 The McKee scrip, as it was
called, eventually came into the hands of a group of adventurers led by
Harvey M. LaFollette and Mathias Benner; they set their sights on using it
to acquire the land east of the original Kinzie’s Addition.152
In 1896, the General Land Office rejected their initial application
seeking a patent to the land as “vacant land of the United States.”153 Later
that year, a new Commissioner of the Land Office, Silas W. Lamoreaux,
was appointed. Lamoreaux proved to be much more accommodating.
Indeed, as events would reveal, he almost certainly engaged in corrupt
collusion with the LaFollette group.154
149

See WILLIAM E. RAILEY, HISTORY OF WOODFORD COUNTY, KENTUCKY 26 (photo. reprint
2002) (1938); To End M’Kee Scrip Case, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1896, at 11.
150
An Act for the Relief of the Widow and Orphan Children of Colonel William R. McKee, Late
of Lexington, Kentucky, 10 Stat. 745 (1853); To End M’Kee Scrip Case, supra note 149.
151
See The M’kee Scrip, INTER OCEAN (Chicago), Aug. 25, 1889, at 8.
152
See Plan to Secure Lake Front Acres, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 20, 1896, at 1.
153
See Brown, supra note 60, at 20.
154
See id. at 22; see also One More on Lamoreux, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1897, at 12 (describing
preferential treatment of the LaFollette group by Lamoreaux).
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The LaFollette group refiled its application, and Lamoreaux quickly
responded by directing a number of clerks from his office to go to Chicago
to conduct a survey of “unsurveyed public land” in the tract in question.155
Fairbank, one of the St. Clair owners, got wind of the planned survey and
filed a protest.156 This was evidently rejected, for within a month the
LaFollette group filed an amended application, this time seeking to patent
“Lot A of said fractional section 10, in township and range aforesaid, as
described and shown on the plat of the official survey of such lands
approved October 15, 1896.”157 The new survey ordered by Lamoreaux
showed all of the lands east of St. Clair as “Lot A,” which it calculated as
comprising 160 acres.158 Being depicted on an official survey of the Land
Office, these lands were by implication deemed to be part of the federal
public domain open for claiming.
After the applicants and the St. Clair Street objectors filed further
evidentiary affidavits, Lamoreaux signed a written opinion on February 20,
1897, awarding a patent to the entire 160 acres to the McKee scrip
claimants.159 Lamoreaux put the decision in a sealed envelope and left it
with his deputy, with instructions that it was to be opened and officially
“promulgated” the following Tuesday, February 23, after the holiday for
Washington’s birthday.160 Lamoreaux then left Washington for a health
spa.161
We should note at this point that, once promulgated, decisions by the
Commissioner of the Land Office awarding patents to federal lands were
very difficult to reverse.162 A rival applicant could appeal to the Secretary
of the Interior, but the established practice was that the Secretary would not
take additional evidence and would reverse a decision only based on clear
error appearing on the record made by the Commissioner.163 Courts were
155

See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 454 (1898).
See id.; see also Brown, supra note 60, at 20 (describing how the survey was ordered without
notice to those in possession of the land).
157
Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 455 (1898) (emphasis added); see Brown,
supra note 60, at 20.
158
See Lake-Front Arguments Closed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1896, at 5.
159
See Brown, supra note 60, at 22; Says Benner Has Won, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1897, at 1.
160
Brown, supra note 60, at 22; May Be a Scandal, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1897, at 1.
161
See Brown, supra note 60, at 23 (noting that Lamoreaux left Washington for White Sulphur
Springs).
162
See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)
(noting that it had been “repeatedly decided” that the resolution of claims to public lands by officers of
the Public Land Office were “conclusive, either upon the particular facts involved . . . or upon the
whole title”). See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801‒1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1696–1734 (2007)
(discussing the development of the Public Land Office and the limited role of courts in adjudicating
public land disputes in the nineteenth century).
163
Rule of Practice 81 provided the right to appeal to the Secretary of the Interior regarding “any
question relating to the disposal of the public lands and to private land claims, except in case of
156
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even more reluctant to intervene. Courts generally treated decisions to
award land patents as an unreviewable matter of administrative discretion,
except perhaps for instances of proven fraud.164
Lamoreaux’s decision and the projected date of promulgation came in
the waning days of President Grover Cleveland’s Administration. Part of
the plan, evidently, was to release the decision sufficiently close to the
turnover of administrations that it could not be easily reversed.165 It was
also alleged, later, that the schemers planned to use photographic copies of
the Lamoreaux opinion to sell lots to investors in Europe before any word
of a reversal could reach them.166 The St. Clair owners nevertheless got
wind that something was up. Being well connected, they interceded with
President Cleveland, who directed that no action be taken to promulgate
any decision on the McKee scrip application without his approval.167
The nervous owners also sent an emissary to Washington to obtain
further assurances that no action would be taken by either the outgoing
Cleveland Administration or the incoming McKinley Administration before
further inquiry could be made into the matter.168 Upon receiving the
required assurances, the emissary left Washington to return to Chicago by
train shortly after the inauguration.169 On the morning of Sunday, March 7,
he stepped off the train in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to purchase a Chicago
paper, where he read an article proclaiming that the LaFollette application
had been granted, complete with extensive quotations from the Lamoreaux
opinion.170 A flurry of panicked telegrams ensued.
It turned out Lamoreaux had secretly given a copy of the decision to
the LaFollette applicants, and they had leaked it to the press.171 Fortunately
for the St. Clair owners, the official copy still sat unopened in the sealed
envelope in Washington.
interlocutory orders and decisions, and orders for hearing or other matter resting in the discretion of the
Commissioner.” Rules of Practice, Revised, 4 Pub. Lands Dec. 35, 46 (1885). But Rule of Practice 72
prevented parties from submitting additional evidence to the Commissioner or Secretary of the Interior
once the contest was closed before the local land officers, unless such new evidence was offered under
stipulation of the parties or as the basis for a new trial. See id. at 45. Furthermore, the Secretary of the
Interior could not reverse a Commissioner’s decision once the Secretary’s predecessor had affirmed the
decision or denied the appeal. See State of Oregon, 3 Pub. Lands Dec. 595, 596 (1885).
164
See Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 81–84 (1871); Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530,
533–34 (1877). Courts began offering limited review later in the nineteenth century in cases alleging
fraud or perjury, and even later for alleged errors of law. See Mashaw, supra note 162, at 1726–27. But
whether such review would lie in any particular case continued to be a matter of uncertainty.
165
See Brown, supra note 60, at 23–24.
166
See id. at 24.
167
See id. at 23.
168
See id. at 24–26.
169
See id. at 26.
170
See id. The article may have been Say Scrip Owners Win, CHI. TIMES-HERALD, Mar. 7, 1897,
at 1, or Says Benner Has Won, supra note 159.
171
See Brown, supra note 60, at 27; May Be a Scandal, supra note 160.
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When the new Secretary of the Interior, Cornelius Bliss, learned of the
premature publication of the decision, he demanded an explanation from
Lamoreaux, who was convalescing in Wisconsin.172 Lamoreaux lamely
confessed he had given a copy of the decision to “a party,” but with
instructions that it was not to be released until promulgated.173 Furious
about the irregularity, and clearly suspicious about Lamoreaux’s role in the
affair, Bliss demanded that Lamoreaux grant an immediate rehearing on the
application.174 Lamoreaux issued the order and was allowed to resign before
the rehearing took place, without any further action taken against him.175
On rehearing, Lamoreaux’s successor, Binger Hermann, rejected the
application.176 LaFollette appealed the decision to Bliss, who affirmed in a
published opinion, which bears the notation that it was “approved” by
Willis Van Devanter, the future Supreme Court Justice, then serving as
Assistant Attorney General.177
LaFollette’s strongest contention on appeal, for which he was able to
cite a number of Land Office precedents, was that the order for the survey
in 1896 was a final determination that the land in question was public land
and that the determination was res judicata and binding on the Department.
Bliss rejected the argument, reasoning that the approval of a survey should
not bar the Department from reexamining the question of public title “at
any time before the legal title has passed from the United States.”178 The
decisions cited by LaFollette, to the extent they suggested to the contrary,
were overruled.179
On the merits, Bliss concluded that the eastern line of north fractional
section 10, as shown on the Wall survey of 1821, was a meander line, not a
boundary line.180 Thus, by referring to the Wall survey in the 1837 patent
issued to Robert A. Kinzie, the United States parted with all interest in the
land up to the shoreline of Lake Michigan.181 All federal interest to the
shore having been parted with, there were no federal public lands available
to claim in the area. The survey ordered by Lamoreaux in 1896 was
annulled because the land surveyed was not part of the public domain.182
172
173
174
175

See Brown, supra note 60, at 27; Lamoreux Is Hit Hard, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1897, at 2.
Brown, supra note 60, at 27; Scrip Report Cast Aside, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 13, 1897, at 1.
See Brown, supra note 60, at 27–28; A Land Office Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1897, at 1.
See Brown, supra note 60, at 28; Lamoreux’s Resignation Accepted, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 1897,

at 9.
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See Decision Against M’Kee Scrip Holders, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1897, at 1; Scrip Claim
Thrown Out, CHI. DAILY NEWS, May 26, 1897, at 1.
177
See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 474 (1898) (notation of approval).
178
Id. at 464.
179
See id. at 465.
180
See id. at 473–74; Scrip Case Is Lost, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1898, at 11; M’Kee Claimants Are
Defeated, CHI. CHRON., Apr. 3, 1898, at 11.
181
See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 473–74 (1898).
182
See id. at 474.
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The opinion said nothing about who in fact was the owner of the 160 acres
east of Kinzie’s Addition. Bliss noted only that after the original patent was
issued to Kinzie, the United States “ceased to be a riparian proprietor and is
therefore not entitled to subsequent accretions.”183
The scheme did not immediately die away. Several years later, we still
read of deeds based on the “McKee scrip” being recorded by unsuspecting
out-of-state investors.184 The St. Clair owners scoffed at these claims, but
the land, despite its prime location, remained largely undeveloped.
B. The Potawatomi Claim
A rival scheme, which drew on some of the same arguments as the
McKee scrip claim, sought to claim the newly formed land for a band of
the Potawatomi Indians. Before European settlers had arrived, the
Potawatomi inhabited the area where Chicago is located.185 In the Treaty of
Greenville of 1795, the United States promised the Potawatomi that they
could continue to occupy this area and that their right of occupancy would
be disturbed only if they entered into a further agreement with the United
States disclaiming occupancy.186 In the Treaty of Chicago of 1833 and the
follow-up Treaty of 1846, the Potawatomi agreed to relinquish their claim
to five million acres of land in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois, in return
for cash and an equivalent number of acres west of the Mississippi.187 These
treaties were understood to extinguish the Potawatomi’s right of
occupancy, which was a precondition to opening the lands to sale by the
federal government.188 No mention was made in any of these treaties of the
submerged land beneath Lake Michigan.
One band of the tribe, known as the Catholic Potawatomi, received
permission to remain in the St. Joseph River Valley in southwest
Michigan.189 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Catholic
Potawatomi, led by an elected business committee, pursued multiple claims
for breaches of treaty obligations before Congress and the federal Court of
183

Id.
See, e.g., In Real Estate Circles, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1901, at 29; Deed Filed to Shore Land
Held Under a Scrip Claim, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1902, at 12.
185
See KEATING, supra note 58, at 12–14.
186
See Treaty of Greenville art. V, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49.
187
See Treaty with the Chippewas, etc. arts. I–III, Sept. 26, 1833, 7 Stat. 431; Treaty with the
Pottowautomie Nation arts. II–IV, June 5 and 17, 1846, 9 Stat. 853.
188
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584–85 (1823); see also STUART BANNER,
HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 178–88 (2005) (providing
background on the Indians’ right of occupancy).
189
For background, see JAMES A. CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON AND THE SAND-BAR CASE:
MICHIGAN POTAWATOMI INDIANS SUE FOR CHICAGO’S LAKE FRONT (n.d.) [hereinafter CLIFTON,
SIMON POKAGON]. A shorter and more accessible version of this account can be found in JAMES A.
CLIFTON, THE POKAGONS, 1683–1983: CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST. JOSEPH RIVER
VALLEY 112–16 (1984).
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Claims, with some success. The self-declared chief of the Catholic
Potawatomi during this period, Simon Pokagon, was a colorful figure who
spent more time on the lecture circuit than he did in the St. Joseph River
Valley. His speaking career was evidently resented by other members of
the tribe, and they deposed him from his position as chairman of the
business committee.190 Perhaps in an effort to regain status with the band,
Pokagon and two Chicago lawyers conceived the idea of making a claim
for the reclaimed land along the Chicago waterfront, including
Streeterville. The lawyers eventually lost interest in the scheme, and
Pokagon, in desperation, “sold” by quitclaim deed the band’s interest in the
Chicago lakefront to another schemer who had previously joined forces
with Streeter, William H. Cox.191
Armed with the “deed” from Pokagon, Cox filed a claim on behalf of
the tribe with the Indian Bureau of the Department of Interior.192 The gist of
the argument was that the Wall survey of 1821 established the shoreline of
Lake Michigan as a boundary rather than a meander line; the Potawatomi
had never relinquished their right of occupancy to the land east of this
boundary; and, therefore, the Bureau should confirm the Indians’ claim to
the land, which the United States would have to acquire by a new treaty if
it wished to permit settlement by non-Indians.193
The Commissioner of the Indian Bureau rejected the claim in 1900, on
the ground that all land east of the Mississippi River that had been occupied
by the Indians had been ceded to the United States by the treaties of 1833
and 1846.194 Later that year, representatives of the Catholic Potawatomi
appeared before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, with the request
that Congress enact legislation giving them the right to sue in the Court of
Claims to “settle the title of lands claimed by them in Lake Michigan.”195
The committee, following the Secretary of the Interior’s recommendation,
found that the Potawatomi had ceded all rights to the lands of Illinois.196
Simon Pokagon died in 1899, and his son, Charles Pokagon, took up
the “Sand-Bar Claim” as his own cause.197 Charles was, if anything, more
melodramatic than his father. In the spring of 1901, he held a press
conference announcing a planned “invasion” of the reclaimed land by a
chartered steamer filled with Potawatomi braves that would embark from
St. Joseph. Once they secured the vacant land in Streeterville, they would
190

See CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON, supra note 189, at 1–2.
Id. at 2–6. Cox may have assisted in forging the patent that Streeter used to dupe investors into
buying lots in Streeter’s “District.” Brown, supra note 60, at 36.
192
See CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON, supra note 189, at 6.
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fan out north and south to capture all the landfilled areas of the lakefront.
The announced invasion generated some amused coverage in the press,198
but never materialized.199
Stimulated by Charles’s fervor, the Potawatomi reasserted their claim
again before the Indian Commissioner in 1902, but he reaffirmed the
determination reached in 1900.200 With respect to the argument that the land
ceded in the treaties did not include “the lands under the water,” the
Commissioner held that this was contrary to settled principles of
international law:
Under a long line of decisions the title to lands under navigable waters and
islands is vested in the sovereign, and as one sovereign withdraws from a
territory this title vests in the succeeding sovereign without any special grant.
This operates in the United States when States are formed out of territories;
the title to the lands under the navigable waters and the control over them
vests in the new States without any grant or conveyance from the United
States.
Therefore it is absolutely certain that the cession by the tribe under the
treaty of 1833 conveys all of the land, and the withdrawal of the United
[tribes] from this territory operated to vest in the United States as sovereign all
the right and title which the united tribes had to lands under the water or in the
waters themselves.201

After this decision, the Potawatomi claim fell quiet for a number of years.
VI. THE LAKESHORE DRIVE EXTENSION
The fourth effort to gain title to the newly created lands east of
Kinzie’s Addition was that of the St. Clair Street owners—those who
traced their title to Kinzie’s original patent plus natural accretions. This
effort was ultimately successful, although the statute that the owners used
as a vehicle to secure their claims contained a substantial gap that left a
portion of the reclaimed land unaddressed.
Let us begin with this: Who exactly were the St. Clair Street owners?
It is difficult to say with complete certainty, although significant
information can be gleaned from two state government inquiries, one an
investigation in 1893 and the other a survey in 1911.202 From south to north
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See Cash or the Tomahawk: Red Men Prepare to Collect a Bill in Chicago, CHI TRIB., Apr. 28,
1901, at 1; Train to Fight Red Men: Citizens Bare Their Arms and Will Sell Lives Dearly, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 29, 1901, at 3.
199
See Indian Invasion a Dream: Chief O’Neill Takes a Weight from Minds of Officials, CHI.
TRIB., May 30, 1901, at 9.
200
See Indians Have No Title to Sell, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1902, at 9.
201
Id.
202
See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING
COMMITTEE, H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1, at 33–49 (Ill. 1911) (Chiperfield Commission); Lincoln Park
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along St. Clair, prominent owners included the Chicago Dock and Canal
Company, the Cyrus McCormick estate, Ogden, Sheldon & Co. (the
William B. Ogden estate), W.C. Newberry, the Potter Palmer estate,
Nathaniel Fairbank, and John V. Farwell. North of Chicago Avenue, the
City of Chicago had constructed a pumping station. Farther north of
Pearson Street, there were no St. Clair Street owners since this land had
been beneath the waters of Lake Michigan when Kinzie’s Addition was
laid out.
This was a virtual Who’s Who of wealthy Chicago families, most of
whom had augmented their wealth at least in part through real estate
dealings. Collectively and individually, they would have had an acute
appreciation of the potential commercial value of the reclaimed land, and
they possessed the resources needed to advance their interests in securing
the rights to it.
The vehicle that the St. Clair owners used to advance their cause was
the Lincoln Park District. The Park District was established as a separate
government entity by state legislation in 1869.203 It was controlled by a
board of commissioners appointed by a state court judge and, hence, was
independent of the mayor and city council, although for state constitutional
reasons the city council had to approve all impositions of taxes to fund the
Park District.204 The Park District was given control over all parks
originally controlled by the City on the north side. Subsequent legislation
adopted in 1889 transferred to the commissioners the State’s title to
submerged land offshore for 1200 feet, for purposes of filling to enhance
the park.205
The main activity of the Lincoln Park District during its early years
was to secure land a mile or more north of Streeterville (specifically,
between North Avenue and Diversey Avenue) along the lakefront and to
fill and landscape this area for what would become Lincoln Park.206 The
resulting park soon included a pleasure drive along the shore of the lake,
called Lake Shore Drive. The original legislation gave the commissioners
authority to extend the drive southward from North Avenue to Oak Street,
where Pine Street (now Michigan Avenue) ended, to be paid for by special
assessments.207 With squabbles over assessments, construction of this
segment of the drive was not completed until 1875.208 A breakwater was
Investigation, CHI. DAILY NEWS, May 13, 1893, at 4 (Bartling Committee); infra text accompanying
notes 238–40, 282–91.
203
See 1869 Ill. Laws 368.
204
See I.J. BRYAN, LINCOLN PARK COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS AND A HISTORY OF
LINCOLN PARK 22–24 (Chicago 1899) (explaining that only directly elected officials could levy taxes).
205
See Brown, supra note 60, at 4.
206
See, e.g., BRYAN, supra note 204, at 34.
207
See 1869 Ill. Laws 374, § 21.
208
See 1 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of Lincoln Park Board: March 16, 1869 to
March 23, 1880, at 253; Announcements, INTER-OCEAN (Chicago), Nov. 6, 1875, at 3.
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constructed outside the drive, but it was inadequate to keep out the lake
waters after storms. Consequently, land on both sides of the drive between
North Avenue and Oak Street was frequently inundated with standing
water.209
In 1885, Potter Palmer startled the Chicago establishment by
abandoning Prairie Street on the near south side and building an enormous
residence on Lake Shore Drive, several blocks south of North Avenue at
what is now Banks Street (Figure 12). Other wealthy families soon
followed suit.210 The property owners quickly agreed to the necessary
supplemental assessments that allowed the commissioners to improve Lake
Shore Drive between Oak Street and North Avenue by enhancing the
breakwater, rebuilding and paving the drive, and filling in and landscaping
the areas in between. Property values on the drive, which enjoyed
unobstructed views of the lake, skyrocketed.211
FIGURE 12: PALMER MANSION212

209

See BRYAN, supra note 204, at 76.
See PAUL GILBERT & CHARLES L. BRYSON, CHICAGO AND ITS MAKERS: A NARRATIVE OF
EVENTS FROM THE DAY OF THE FIRST WHITE MAN TO THE INCEPTION OF THE SECOND WORLD’S FAIR
197–98 (1929). Palmer’s mansion on Lake Shore Drive was “[b]y far the most famous, probably the
largest, and by all odds the most imposing house in [Chicago].” THOMAS E. TALLMADGE,
ARCHITECTURE IN OLD CHICAGO 184 (1941).
211
Cf. BRYAN, supra note 204, at 76. After the improvements and construction of Potter Palmer’s
mansion, “[l]and values in this neighborhood rose from $160 a front foot in 1882 to $800 in 1892.”
3 BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO: THE RISE OF A MODERN CITY 1871–1893, at 60
(1957).
212
Potter Palmer’s residence, formerly located north of “Streeterville” at 1350 N. Lake Shore Drive
(formerly 100 Lake Shore Drive). On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-39490.
210
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Some of the wealthy individuals and families who owned property on
Lake Shore Drive, including Palmer, also held interests on St. Clair
Street.213 It is fair to surmise that cordial relations developed between the
Lake Shore Drive owners and the commissioners of Lincoln Park when the
owners were funding the enhancements to Lake Shore Drive north of Oak
Street. Such relations presumably made it relatively easy for the St. Clair
owners to enlist the aid of the commissioners in helping to secure their
interests south of Oak Street. The plan that was hatched, according to an
early history of Lincoln Park, “was first suggested on April 27, 1886, when
H.I. Sheldon, representing Ogden, Sheldon & Co., large owners of property
on the lake shore south of Chicago Avenue, proposed to the commissioners
the extension of the Lake Shore Drive south of Pearson Street.”214 The
scheme, as refined, called for the commissioners to construct an extension
of Lake Shore Drive that would swing east from Oak Street, sweep around
and then turn south outside the existing accreted and landfilled area, and
terminate at Ohio Street.215 Thus, the plan would add significant new land
to the existing reclaimed land (which had been created by accretions and
landfills). The extension would be paid for by special assessments imposed
on the St. Clair Street owners.216 The commissioners, in turn, would transfer
to the owners title to the new land between the new drive and the existing
shoreline to the west as compensation for their assistance in funding the
construction project.217
The only plausible rationale for this plan was to secure title to the
contested land for the St. Clair owners. The proposed extension of Lake
Shore Drive was, to borrow a modern expression, a road to nowhere. The
drive would dead end at Indiana Street (modern-day Grand Avenue), where
it was blocked by the Michigan Canal and beyond that by the Chicago
River. There were no structures of any consequence along the route. There
were no existing cross streets. There would be views of the lake to the east,
but nothing save mud, garbage, and a few squatter shacks to the west.
Anyone out for a Sunday carriage ride would find the existing Lake Shore
Drive north of Oak Street, and especially the section of the drive through
Lincoln Park, infinitely more pleasant. Photographs of the respective areas
about this time confirm this (contrast Figure 13 with Figure 14).
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See KLATT, supra note 108, at 61.
BRYAN, supra note 204, at 90; see also 2 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of
Lincoln Park Board: April 3, 1880 to December 16, 1890, at 213.
215
See BRYAN, supra note 204, at 90; Will Extend the Drive, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1891, at 1; see
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17, 1896, at 14, 91.
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See Will Extend the Drive, supra note 215; Live Property Owners: They Plan to Connect the
Lincoln and South Park Systems, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1889, at 3.
217
See Live Property Owners, supra note 216; 4 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of
Lincoln Park Board: July 1, 1896 to April 9, 1899, at 56.
214

1099

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 13: DESOLATE STREETERVILLE (1909)
(LOOKING NORTHEAST TO THE LAKE)218

FIGURE 14: LINCOLN PARK (1905)219
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Once the plan was agreed upon, the commissioners sought to
implement it under their existing authority but were blocked when the
Illinois attorney general sued to stop construction.220 The commissioners
then proposed legislation specifically authorizing the scheme. The bill was
conveniently paired with another bill authorizing an extension of Lake
Shore Drive north of Lincoln Park.221 The Illinois General Assembly
approved it on June 4, 1889.222 The first section of the Act, speaking in
general terms, gave any “board of park commissioners existing under the
laws of this State” and having control over any boulevard or driveway
bordering “any public waters in this State” the “power . . . to extend such
boulevard or driveway . . . over and upon the bed of such public waters,”
provided that the extension did not interfere with public navigation.223 The
second section required the commissioners to obtain “the consent in writing
of the owners of at least two-thirds of the frontage of all the lands . . . in
front of which it is proposed to extend such boulevard or driveway for the
making of such extension.”224 The riparian rights of all affected owners
were to be purchased by the commissioners, and, failing purchase, could be
taken by eminent domain. The third section, critical for our purposes,
provided as follows:
[T]he submerged lands lying between the shore of such public waters and the
inner line of the extension of such boulevard or driveway shall be
appropriated by the board of park commissioners to the purpose of defraying
the cost of such extension and to that end such board of park commissioners
are authorized to sell and convey such submerged lands in fee simpl[e] by
deeds duly executed on its behalf by its president and under its corporate seal,
and every deed executed in pursuance hereof shall vest a good title in the
grantee to the premises intended to be conveyed thereby.225

The fourth section provided that once the extension was completed, the
new drive would become part of the Park District and subject to its
control.226
Although the statute called for a sale of the lands between the new
drive and the existing shoreline, we are told in a memoir by one of the
attorneys for the commissioners that “it was not the intention of the persons
instrumental in securing the passage of the act that this course should be
adopted.”227 Instead, “it was plainly the intention to come by negotiation
220
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between the Commissioners and the shore owners to some agreement” in
which the landowners would fund the construction of the drive and in
return gain title to the filled land between the shore and the drive.228
FIGURE 15: LAKE SHORE DRIVE EXTENSION FROM PEOPLE EX REL. MOLONEY V. KIRK (1896)229

228
229
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This close observer went on to acknowledge that “[i]t was foreseen
that some opposition would undoubtedly develop to this scheme and that
whatever was done, it would probably be charged that the shore owners
were getting an undue advantage of the public.”230 But in order to “forestall
the force of adverse criticism as far as possible,” a carefully orchestrated
series of consultations was planned.231 First, a “selected committee” of
eminent citizens, including Elbert Gary (of judiciary fame, as the song from
The Music Man goes), was asked to examine the scheme and opine whether
it was in the public interest.232 The committee did so and duly rendered the
required judgment. Second, the Army Corps of Engineers was asked to
examine the scheme to determine if it presented any interference regarding
the rights of navigation.233 The chief engineer in Chicago reported to the
War Department that he saw no objection, and proponents of the land-grab
scheme heralded the Department’s silence as tacit approval in this regard.234
Contracts for construction were quickly executed in 1891.235 Deeds
granting the right to fill land between the roadway and the existing
shoreline were made out to the landowners and placed in escrow with the
Northern Trust Company, to be delivered when the owners complied with
covenants requiring that they underwrite the cost of the fill and
construction of the drive.236 The work was scheduled to be completed by
1893.237 Nevertheless, the effort to lull the public into supporting the project
did not succeed. Before the fill activity had gone very far, two
investigations were launched that brought the work to a stop.
The first investigation was undertaken by a special committee of the
Illinois Senate, known as the Bartling Committee after its chairman. The
committee issued a report that excoriated the project, describing it as a
“theft from the navigable waters of Lake Michigan” that “leads nowhere
and is valuable only to the abutting and contiguous property owners as an
exit from the made land.”238 The committee surmised that “the property
owners by undue influence of some sort used the Lincoln Park
Commissioners” to advance their own interests; it estimated the value of
the newly made land transferred to the owners to be from “8 to 12
Millions.”239 The report concluded by recommending that “the Attorney
230
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General of the State of Illinois take all necessary steps to obtain possession
of the lands created in the waters of Lake Michigan and do all in his power
to prevent greedy owners of riparian rights from encroaching upon the
waters of the Lake.”240
The Illinois attorney general, Maurice Moloney, promptly launched
his own investigation and concurred that an excessive amount of
submerged land would be taken from the public, primarily for private
gain.241 He announced on May 22, 1894, that he was filing suit on behalf of
the State against the commissioners and the St. Clair Street owners.242 The
suit demanded that the statute be declared unconstitutional, all construction
contracts declared void and cancelled, all filling of submerged lands
removed, and the submerged lands restored to the condition they had been
in before any encroachments took place.243 The Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
acting on behalf of the owners, filed suit against the commissioners
demanding that the contracts be specifically performed.244 The
commissioners filed a cross bill asking that their title to the land be quieted
and their right to levy special assessments on the owners to complete and
maintain the drive be declared.245
Moloney’s case against the Lake Shore Drive extension was
powerfully reinforced by the then-recent decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Illinois Central case.246 In 1869, the Illinois legislature had
granted the submerged land south of the Chicago River, for the distance of
one mile into the lake, to the Illinois Central for the purpose of the
railroad’s constructing a new outer harbor. In 1873, the legislature had
repealed the grant. The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Stephen Field in 1892, upheld the repeal over the railroad’s claim that it
impaired vested rights. The Court confirmed that the State of Illinois
owned the submerged land but said that it did not hold such lands subject to
barter and sale, as did the United States with respect to its public lands.
Instead, the submerged lands were held in trust for the benefit of the public.
“The trust with which they are held,” the Court said, “is governmental and
cannot be alienated, except in those instances . . . of parcels used in the
improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of
without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters
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remaining.”247 Moloney thus had a powerful argument that the legislature,
in conveying some ninety-three acres of submerged land to the adjacent
shore owners to compensate them for building the new drive, had violated
this public trust.
The matter came before Judge Windes, of the circuit court, who
dismissed the attorney general’s action for want of equity. Windes
acknowledged that title to lands under the waters of Lake Michigan was
held by Illinois “in trust for the people for all purposes of which it may be
used beneficially.”248 He nevertheless concluded that the legislature had
plenary authority “to convey the fee of lands covered by waters of the lake
to private individuals for the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to the
people of the State.”249
In 1896, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.250 Reflecting popular
hostility toward the scheme, the court voiced its displeasure with the
legislation. If the matter were a “question of policy” to be determined by
the court, it said, “we would have no hesitation in condemning the action of
the legislature in passing the act as unwise and detrimental to the best
interest of the people of the State.”251 But the court wrote that the propriety
or impropriety of the legislation was a matter for the legislature to
determine, not for the courts:
The legislature represents not only the State, which holds the title which at
common law was vested in the crown, but the legislature also represents the
public, for whose benefit the title is held, and in that capacity it possesses the
sovereign power of parliament over the waters of the lake and the submerged
lands covered by the waters.252

The court found no compelling evidence that the extensive landfill would
interfere with navigation or with fishing. And because the new drive would
remain under the control of park commissioners for park purposes, the
legislature had made no attempt “to relinquish its governmental powers or
place them beyond the power of future legislation.”253
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The Kirk court also upheld the critical provision of the Act that
allowed the submerged lands between the drive and the shore to be filled
and transferred to private parties to fund the construction of the drive.
Although the Act spoke of a sale of these lands, there could be no objection
to conveying them to the adjacent shore owners, the court concluded, so
long as the commissioners received full value for the submerged land in the
form of improvements financed by the landowners. The court failed to
address the obvious objection that the government did relinquish control
with respect to the submerged lands between the drive and the shore, as
they would fall into private hands. But the court concluded with a sentence
that no doubt caught the eyes of the lawyers at Chicago Title & Trust Co.:
“The right of a shore owner on Lake Michigan to fill up portions of the lake
and thus extend his lands does not arise in this case and that question will
not be considered.”254
VII. THE SLOW BIRTH OF STREETERVILLE
The St. Clair Street owners had won. Or had they? One of the puzzles
of the history of Streeterville is that development of the area failed to take
off after the Illinois Supreme Court blessed the Lake Shore Drive extension
in 1896, including the transfer of ninety-three acres of new landfill to the
St. Clair Street owners. The drive was eventually completed, even if not
until sometime after 1902.255 A railroad poster depicting the lakefront,
published in that year, shows the area as devoid of any buildings whatever.
FIGURE 16: BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF CHICAGO LAKEFRONT (1902)256

254

Id. at 157, 45 N.E. at 837.
The segment of the drive that swung east into the lake from Oak Street was the last to be
completed. The commissioners had agreed to fund this segment themselves, and it proved to be more
expensive than contemplated. The contractor also made an error that resulted in the reclamation of more
land in this area than the plan contemplated, which generated more fodder for the legislative and
judicial investigations. See KLATT, supra note 108, at 62.
256
On file with the Library of Congress g4104c pm020210, available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/
g4104c.pm020210. Streeterville is the area north of the river and along the lake.
255
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To be sure, once the drive was completed, new buildings eventually
followed. But the pace of development was exceedingly slow, especially
given the prime location of the land. In 1912, a ten-story cooperative
apartment building went up on Oak Street, on landfill created by the
commissioners, where the new drive turned south.257 In 1916, a new factory
was constructed at the foot of Ohio Street.258 The Drake Hotel graced the
corner of Michigan Avenue and Oak Street starting in 1920, although this
was at least partially on land included in original section 3.259 Several other
apartment buildings along Oak Street east of Michigan Avenue, again on
landfill created to build the drive, followed. In 1923, the east side of the
American Furniture Mart, now 680 North Lake Shore Drive, went up,
again on new landfill (the west side with the tower was completed in
1926).260 Strikingly, however, an aerial photograph of the area taken in
1925—nearly three decades after the Kirk decision—reveals that there were
still relatively few buildings of any substance in the area. (See Figure 17.)
An armory had been constructed on the land east of the City’s water tower
pumping station.261 But the land where Northwestern University would
locate its downtown campus remained vacant, until the groundbreaking for
Ward Hall, Wieboldt Hall, and Levy Mayer Hall occurred in 1926.262
FIGURE 17: CHICAGO AERIAL PHOTO (1925)263

257

See FRANK A. RANDALL, HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION IN
CHICAGO 244 (1949).
258
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 119. This was the Pelouze Building, 218–30 E. Ohio Street. See
RANDALL, supra note 257, at 252.
259
See RANDALL, supra note 257, at 255.
260
See id. at 260.
261
See id. at 262; see also Frank R. Schwengel, The New Armory of the 122nd Field Artillery in
Chicago, 16 FIELD ARTILLERY J. 1, 1 (1926) (providing history, photographs, and details of the
armory).
262
See RANDALL, supra note 257, at 270.
263
Photograph courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago, Midwest MS Sloan No. 3090.
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One reason why construction proceeded so slowly is that agitation and
litigation over ownership rights to the reclaimed land did not end with the
decision in Kirk in 1896. Streeter lay low for several years after his release
from prison in 1904. But by 1909 he was back on the vacant land, living in
an abandoned omnibus and selling lots to the unsuspecting.264 In 1912, a
sympathetic Chicago alderman arranged for Streeter to occupy the back
end of a small brick structure on Chestnut Street, where he and Ma Streeter
sold soda pop, liquor, and copies of his biography.265
Streeter was bloodied in a massive attack by the Chicago police in
1915, which was provoked, according to a recent account, because Streeter
had insulted Mayor William Hale Thompson.266 Although Streeter got the
worst of the encounter, he was charged with assault. Defending himself
once again, he was acquitted by the jury.267 Chicago Title & Trust Co.
finally obtained an order to demolish the Streeters’ makeshift store in 1918,
whereupon the couple retired to a boathouse in Indiana Harbor.268
Streeter died in 1921. His funeral was attended by Mayor Thompson,
who led a forty-car motorcade to Graceland Cemetery, final resting place
of the Chicago elite.269 The president of Chicago Title & Trust Co., who no
doubt had mixed feelings about the event, wrote a short eulogy printed in
the Chicago Tribune:
The Cap’n’s ideas of law were somewhat at variance with that of the
preponderant legal opinion but he was a gallant and able protagonist
nevertheless. We shall miss him more than might be imagined. He kept two
lawyers and one vice president busy for twenty-one years . . . may he rest in
peace and find his lost “deestrict” in some fairer land where the courts cease
from troubling and title companies are at rest.270

Streeter may have found lasting peace, but the title company did not.
Ma Streeter continued the quest for vindication, filing a lawsuit in Cook
County Circuit Court in 1924 seeking $100 million in damages from the St.
Clair property owners, the Lincoln Park Commissioners, and Chicago Title
& Trust Co.271 The suit was dismissed without prejudice and later dropped.
Ma was back with a similar claim in federal court in 1925, but lost when
the judge ruled she had not been properly married to Streeter—he had
264

See KLATT, supra note 108, at 107–08.
See id. at 111–12.
266
See id. at 115–16.
267
See id. at 116–17; ‘Cap’ Streeter Turns Lawyer in Own Behalf: Avoids Fireworks and Makes a
Plea for “Justice” When His Attorney Is Ruled Out, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1916, at 17.
268
See KLATT, supra note 108, at 117–19.
269
See id. at 120–21.
270
Id. at 122 (alteration in original).
271
See “Ma” Streeter Sues for Cool $100,000,000, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1924, at 13; ‘Ma’ Streeter
Fights for Chicago Lands: Takes Up Battle of Shooting ‘Cap’n’ and Sues 1,500 Persons for
$1,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1924, at 23.
265
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failed to terminate at least one previous marriage—and so she did not
inherit any of his “right.”272
Meanwhile the Potawatomi claim, after lying dormant for several
years, sprang back to life in 1909. The occasion was a proposal for state
legislation that would permit the Illinois Steel Company to engage in
extensive landfilling to enlarge its plant site on Lake Michigan near the
Calumet River, some ten miles to the south of Streeterville.273 William
H. Cox and William E. Johnson submitted a protest on behalf of the
Potawatomi to the Illinois legislature, claiming that the tribe still owned the
submerged land.274 The argument fell on deaf ears, and the transfer of land
to the steel company was approved on June 15, 1909.275 Later that year,
plans for constructing a massive new public pier into the lake at Grand
Avenue were unveiled. The Indians’ claim was again raised as a potential
complicating factor.276 An investigative body, the Chiperfield Commission,
determined that the Chicago lakefront was securely under the State’s
dominion.277 In 1914, after four years of planning, the construction of
Municipal Pier, soon to be renamed Navy Pier, was underway.278
In a final effort to vindicate the Potawatomi claim, the tribal band’s
business committee persuaded two Chicago lawyers to test the claim in
litigation. The end came swiftly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dismissed a complaint filed by the Potawatomi, finding
that “the Indians cannot claim land which they abandoned eighty years
ago.”279 In 1917, the Supreme Court affirmed in a terse decision.280 Justice
James C. McReynolds saw no need to construe the treaties or determine the
original rights of the Potawatomi to the submerged lands:
If in any view [the Potawatomi] ever held possession of the property here in
question we know historically that this was abandoned long ago and that for

272

Judge Rules Against “Ma” Streeter’s Claims, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1925, at 1; “Ma” Streeter
Denied Title to the “Deestrict,” CHI. EVENING POST, Apr. 21, 1925, at 9.
273
See COMM. ON PARKS & BOULEVARDS, AMENDMENTS TO SENATE–NO. 284, S. 46-284 (Ill.
1909).
274
Cox and Johnson submitted the protest on behalf of the Pokagon Tribal Government of the
Potawatomi Indians of Michigan and Indiana. See PROTEST AGAINST SENATE BILL NO. 284, AS BEING
INTRODUCED IN THE ILLINOIS SENATE, S. 46-284, at 1–4 (Ill. 1909).
275
See S.B. 284, 46th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 1909) (approving sale to the Illinois Steel Co.); Sale to
Illinois Steel Company, 1909 Ill. Laws 434.
276
See Ignores Indians’ Claim to Shore: Secretary Dickinson Says Pier Permit Does Not Involve
Title to Land, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1909, at 9.
277
See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING
COMMITTEE, H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1, at 17 (Ill. 1911); see also infra text accompanying notes 282–91.
278
See DOUGLAS BUKOWSKI, NAVY PIER: A CHICAGO LANDMARK 20 (1996).
279
Indians’ Suit for Strip on Lake Front Rejected, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1914, at 14.
280
See Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434 (1917).
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more than a half century it has not even pretended to occupy either the shores
or waters of Lake Michigan within the confines of Illinois.281

After decades of agitation in multiple forums, the claim advanced on behalf
of the Potawatomi was rejected on a simple theory of abandonment.
In short, the period from 1909 to 1924 witnessed continued
contestation, including litigation, over ownership of the vacant lands
between St. Clair Street and the new Lake Shore Drive extension. Although
in hindsight none of the protests or lawsuits posed a particularly serious
threat to the interests of the St. Clair Street owners, this may not have been
so clear at the time. Moreover, it is striking that, once again, the claims of
the rival contestants were not resolved on the merits, with an affirmation
that the St. Clair Street owners had title to the land. Instead, the claims of
the rivals were disposed of on collateral grounds—such as Ma Streeter’s
invalid marriage and the Potawatomi’s abandonment of any rights to the
land.
The uncertainty created by the never-ending contestation of private
claimants was magnified by the emergence of new assertions of public
rights in the reclaimed land. Legally speaking, the most notable call for
public ownership and control came from a committee appointed by the
state legislature to ascertain the extent of the State’s rights in submerged
and shore lands, and to determine how far those rights had been “usurped
by private individuals, corporations, and companies.”282 Called the
Submerged and Shore Lands Legislative Investigating Committee, and
known informally as the Chiperfield Commission, the committee produced
a three-volume report in 1911 that called for a vigorous assertion of public
rights in order to end “piratical encroachments for private gain.”283 In the
best tradition of the Progressive Era, the commission argued that
government ownership of submerged and reclaimed shore lands should be
vigorously maintained, a new “Rivers and Lakes Commission” created to
monitor public rights in submerged lands, and the attorney general charged
to roll back existing private encroachments.284 The objective was not to
preserve submerged lands in their natural state, as would become the
animating focus of the public trust doctrine later in the century.285 Rather, it
was to reserve land for public purposes such as a new outer harbor for

281

Id. at 437.
REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE,
H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1. at 18 (Ill. 1911).
283
Id. at 12.
284
Id. at 6–7.
285
See generally James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (describing possible bases for the public trust
doctrine and, incidentally, its development).
282
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Chicago and to facilitate the development of “waste lands” adjacent to the
shore.286
Buried in the Commission’s report was an analysis, prepared by an
attorney for the City of Chicago, of the Michigan Canal project sponsored
by the Chicago Dock and Canal Company.287 The analysis sharply
questioned the legality of artificial landfilling that had occurred to the north
of the canal site and concluded that “[t]he title of the Chicago Dock and
Canal Company, at least to the north half of this land, is not free from
cloud. The cloud on the company’s title is the claim which might be made
by the State of Illinois.”288
Turning to the Lake Shore Drive extension, the commission
condemned the project as having no evident purpose other than “that it was
consummated to acquire title in behalf of special interests.”289 It demanded
that the attorney general commence new litigation to determine “whether or
not property worth millions of dollars [had been] given to private property
owners to further augment and swell their holdings.”290 The commission
thought it self-evident that such a giveaway of valuable submerged land by
the park commission would be “wholly odious to the theory that the people
are the true owners of the submerged lands of the State of Illinois, and that
such lands are irrevocably dedicated for public purposes.”291 These
sentiments were undoubtedly noted by the St. Clair Street owners and their
legal advisors, and could only instill further caution in them about
proceeding with any development in the area.
More-specific plans were also afoot to use the reclaimed land for
public purposes. The influential Plan of Chicago, published in 1909 by the
Commercial Club, featured two gigantic piers jutting into the lake, one on
each side of the downtown lakefront.292 (See Figure 18.) Daniel Burnham
and Edward Bennett located the northern pier at Chicago Avenue—that is,
squarely in the middle of Streeterville. Other sketches in the plan showed
multiple docks jutting off the north pier to accommodate freight
steamers.293 At least implicitly, Burnham’s plan contemplated that the area
around the Lake Shore Drive extension would develop as a giant maritime
port.

286

See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING
COMMITTEE, H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1, at 9.
287
Id. vol. 2, at 198–206.
288
Id. at 203.
289
Id. at 207.
290
Id. at 211.
291
Id.
292
See DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO fig.CXXXVII (Da Capo
Press 1970) (1909).
293
See id. at 64 fig.LXXI.
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FIGURE 18: PLAN OF CHICAGO (1909)
(LOOKING WEST FROM THE LAKE)294

This was scarcely the only plan to convert the area into a port. The
Pugh Terminal Company proposed a plan in 1908 to build three piers north
of the Chicago River.295 The Chicago Sanitary Board released a plan in
1910 for six piers to be built between the Chicago River and Pearson
Street, each with a warehouse designed to accommodate four million tons
of freight annually.296 The next year, Mayor Carter Harrison proposed a
plan calling for twenty-five miles of docks and recreation piers in the
area.297 Eventually, the City Council approved a plan in 1912 to build two
piers, a 3000-feet-long one for passengers and packages and a somewhat
shorter one for heavy freight.298 This evolved into the plan for Municipal
Pier No. 2 (now Navy Pier), construction of which started in 1914 at the
foot of Grand Avenue.299 The second pier never came to fruition.
The Kirk decision, far from suppressing dreams about grand public
plans for the lakefront in this area, could be read as encouraging them. The
opinion reaffirmed the overriding importance of navigation on the lake and
stated that the 1889 legislation did not relinquish the legislature’s
governmental powers over the lake “or place them beyond the power of
future legislation.”300 In effect, the strong public rights associated with
submerged lands meant that a public claim on the future development of
the lakefront in this area as a harbor facility remained a distinct possibility.
This, too, magnified the uncertainty associated with the land, and
294

On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-64844.
See Docks in the Lake; $8,000,000 Project, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1908, at 1; Bids for Chance to
Build 3 Piers: Pugh Terminal Co. Submits Definite Plans for Work North of River Mouth, CHI. TRIB.,
July 7, 1909, at 3.
296
See Move in Unity for Chicago Harbor, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1910, at 1.
297
See Mayor’s Harbor Plan for 25 Miles of Docks and Recreation Piers, CHI. TRIB., July 29,
1911, at 4.
298
See O.K. Harbor Plan; Up to U.S., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1912, at 2.
299
See BUKOWSKI, supra note 278, at 20.
300
People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 151, 45 N.E. 830, 835 (1896).
295
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undoubtedly caused those who might otherwise have initiated private
commercial development to hesitate until the ultimate use of the area had
been settled.
VIII. OVERCOMING A FLAWED TITLE
The deeper question is why these rival private and public claims
persisted when the Kirk decision, notwithstanding its qualifying language,
seemed to deal a decisive victory for the St. Clair Street owners. The
ultimate reason, we believe, is that the title claims of the St. Clair Street
owners were seriously flawed—and they were flawed in a way that the
1889 legislation and the Kirk decision did not cure.
Oversimplifying slightly, one can picture the question of title to the
Streeterville land as involving three layers (or increments) of new solid
land formed on submerged land east of Kinzie’s Addition. The first layer
(shown in the darkest gray in Figure 19 below) consisted of ordinary
accretion formed by the action of the counterclockwise current in Lake
Michigan. Once it was determined that the St. Clair Street owners had
riparian title east of St. Clair Street,301 this land rightly belonged to them
under settled rules of title by accretion. The second layer (shown in Figure
19 with a dotted line marked “1886” down the middle of the layer)
consisted of artificial fill added outside the original area of accretion,
whether by the construction of the pier that incorporated the Michigan
Canal, or by the depositing of refuse in the lake after the fire of 1871, or by
the use of the area as a general dump for city and contractors’ refuse, or by
the efforts of Streeter and his followers. The construction of the pier and
slip was arguably justified by the wharfing-out privilege. But the other
forms of fill were not authorized, and thus the riparian owners could not
claim them as either accretions or avulsions. Once it became clear that the
State owned the submerged land,302 this layer of fill presumably belonged
to the State. The third layer (east from the 1892 shoreline to the lake)
consisted of the ninety-three acres of new land added by the Lincoln Park
Commissioners in constructing and obtaining financial support for the Lake
Shore Drive extension. This layer had been granted by the State to the
Lincoln Park Commissioners, who had in turn granted much of it to the
riparian owners, in a transaction upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in
the Kirk case.303 To be sure, there was the nettlesome sentence in the court’s
opinion saying that the right of the riparian owners to “fill up portions of
the lake” was not being adjudicated in the case.304 Did this refer to artificial
301

See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57
(1864)).
302
See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 45 N.E. 830, and
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
303
See supra text accompanying notes 213–54.
304
Kirk, 162 Ill. at 157, 45 N.E. at 837.
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filling that occurred before the Lake Shore Drive extension—that is, to
filling in layer two? Or did it refer to the filling authorized in layer three—
in other words, was the court upholding the construction of the drive only?
So the third layer, like the first, most likely belonged to the St. Clair Street
owners, although the matter was hardly free from doubt.
Figure 19 gives a sense of these layers.
FIGURE 19: “THREE LAYERS”
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We can be sure that more than one lawyer for the Chicago Title &
Trust Co. puzzled over the state of title created by this three-layered cake.
What did it mean if title to the outer layers was probably good but to the
middle layer likely bad? Would the soundness of the outer layers rescue the
middle? Or did the lack of good title to the middle infect and invalidate the
outer? In retrospect, the St. Clair Street owners had failed in not securing
language in the 1889 legislation ratifying all existing fills between the
original shoreline of 1821 and the new Lake Shore Drive extension. In
1889, it might have been possible to insert dexterous language in the statute
that would have cleared everything up. But by 1893, the public outcry over
the Lake Shore Drive “steal” meant that a legislative fix was out of the
question.305
Once it became clear that the 1889 legislation and Kirk did not fully
remove the cloud on the title of the St. Clair owners, the straightforward
solution would have been to file an action to quiet title and ask the courts to
declare who owned Streeterville.306 Surely this was considered. But the
judgment was evidently reached that it was too risky. As previously noted,
after Fairbank suffered a setback during a forcible entry and detainer action
against Streeter in 1891—when Streeter pointed out to the court that
Fairbank did not have title to land created by artificial filling—the St. Clair
Street owners consistently avoided any legal challenge that would require a
judicial determination of their rights.307
If the St. Clair owners were unwilling to risk a quiet title action, how
were they to secure the fruits of their legal maneuvering to gain effective
rights to the land? The only answer was to establish visible occupation of
the land through significant development. If individuals or entities could be
persuaded to build substantial structures on the land, especially structures
occupied by institutions engaged in respectable activities, this would soon
establish a collective sense that the St. Clair owners had acquired “vested
rights” in the filled land. After a time, if someone tried to challenge the
occupants’ title based on the unextinguished claims of the State, the

305

See supra text accompanying notes 230–54.
Quiet title actions had been recognized in Illinois. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jones, 86 Ill. 313, 315–16
(1877) (stating that an action to quiet title may be brought by a party who is in possession of the land in
controversy or claims to be the owner of land that is unimproved and unoccupied).
307
An action for partition, which was in effect a quiet title action, was filed in Barney v. Board of
Commissioners, 203 Ill. 397, 67 N.E. 801 (1903). The action concerned parkland at Oak Street and
Michigan Avenue—in front of where the Drake Hotel stands today—and was brought by speculators
who had acquired a reversion in this land at an execution sale. The litigation was a long-shot attempt to
have the title of the Lincoln Park Commissioners declared void, converting the reversion into a fee
simple. See id. at 398–99, 67 N.E. at 801. Needless to say, the effort failed. The action did not touch the
area that was truly vulnerable to legal challenge, which was the “middle layer” of landfill, south of Oak
Street, composed of artificial fill not sanctioned by the State.
306
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St. Clair Street owners could claim estoppel, laches, or abandonment—and
hope this would prevail with the courts.308
The problem with this strategy is that it presented a kind of prisoner’s
dilemma, as each St. Clair owner would rationally prefer that someone else
be the first mover to risk constructing a substantial structure on the land.
The full story of how the St. Clair Street owners overcame this prisoner’s
dilemma will probably never be known. Nevertheless, the manner in which
Northwestern University came to acquire a significant portion of the land in
the 1920s provides a window into how Streeterville eventually came to be
regarded as solid land of secure title, no different from other land in
commercially developed sections of Chicago.
Starting around 1913, the Northwestern professional schools located in
the City of Chicago—law, medicine, dentistry, and commerce—all began
looking for new quarters.309 Each of the schools preferred to stay in
Chicago rather than move to Evanston, where the main university campus
was located.310 The leader of the professional schools at the time was John
Henry Wigmore, dean of the law school from 1901 to 1929.311 In 1916,
Wigmore surveyed the deans of the various professional schools and
reported to the university about their needs in terms of new space. As to
location, he reported that the deans had agreed upon three criteria: south of
Chicago Avenue, east of LaSalle Street, and west of Pine Street (Michigan
Avenue).312 Thus, as of 1916, Wigmore and his colleagues preferred the
North Side but were not thinking about locating in Streeterville. The
principal difficulty (as always) was to find the money to pay for a
substantial piece of real estate and the construction of new buildings in this
preferred area.
About the same time, Nathan William MacChesney, an influential
Chicago attorney and a powerful trustee of Northwestern, proposed that the
Northwestern professional schools build a new campus on the largely
vacant land in Streeterville.313 In particular, MacChesney suggested that
308

Something like this strategy would work for the Illinois Central Railroad when it sought to
develop the air rights above its landfill south of the river. The Illinois Supreme Court eventually held in
Hickey v. Illinois Central Railroad, 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966), that although the State’s title
to the air rights had never been extinguished, the State was estopped from challenging private
development of the air rights by its long inaction in defending its title. See id. at 449–50, 220 N.E.2d at
427. By the time the litigation arose, the air rights were occupied by, among other structures, the
Prudential Insurance Company building, then the tallest building in Chicago. See id. at 445, 220 N.E.2d
at 424.
309
Cf. WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE 155 (1977); Letter from John H. Wigmore to
Col. Nathan W. MacChesney 1 (June 20, 1916).
310
See, e.g., Letter from John H. Wigmore to William A. Dyche (Feb. 5, 1919); Letter from John
H. Wigmore to William A. Dyche (Feb. 15, 1919).
311
See ROALFE, supra note 309, at 45–75, 179–84.
312
See Letter from John H. Wigmore to Col. Nathan W. MacChesney 3 (June 20, 1916).
313
See Nathan W. MacChesney, Report of Committee on Increasing Endowment (Oct. 26, 1915),
in NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MINUTES: JULY 1,
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Northwestern purchase the Farwell property located between Superior
Street and Chicago Avenue and the Fairbank property located between
Huron and Superior streets. When university officials expressed interest in
this idea, Wigmore quickly threw his support behind the plan, silently
dropping the condition that the land had to be west of Michigan Avenue.314
In 1917, MacChesney and William Dyche, Northwestern’s business
manager, negotiated options to purchase the Farwell and Fairbank
properties.315 When World War I intervened, the options expired.316 After
the war was over, Wigmore succeeded in getting the options renewed.317
The board of trustees approved the acquisitions in the fall of 1919.318
Northwestern finally acquired the Farwell property in 1920 for $999,049.319
The university purchased the Fairbank property at the same time for
$421,211.320
In 1927, Northwestern purchased an additional contiguous five acres
from the Newberry Library, thereby enlarging the Chicago campus from

1915 TO JUNE 30, 1916, at 161–64; Letter from Nathan W. MacChesney to North Central Association
(May 19, 1920).
314
See Nathan W. MacChesney, Reminiscences of Forty Years’ Association with Dean Wigmore
28–32 (n.d.).
315
See Nathan William MacChesney, The Genesis and History of Northwestern University
Downtown Campus, NW. U. ALUMNI NEWS, May 1923, at 3, 5; Kevin Leonard, The Origins of
Northwestern University’s Chicago Campus—1915–1926, at 3, 10 (June 1, 1976) (unpublished paper,
Northwestern University); The Romance of the City Campus of Northwestern University (document
available in folder marked Chicago Campus 1923–1925, 1929, 1933–1938, 1941, 1943, 1945–1947 in
MacChesney Box 2 at Northwestern University Archives).
316
See ROALFE, supra note 309, at 155–56; HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON & PAYSON S. WILD,
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 1850–1975, at 120, 139 (1976); see also Leonard, supra note
315, at 11 (concluding that the options likely expired because of America’s participation in the war,
notwithstanding MacChesney’s claim decades later that he personally carried the options from 1917 to
1919); MacChesney, supra note 315 (claiming that the options could not be exercised because of the
war and that MacChesney and Dyche kept the options alive).
317
See Letter from Wigmore to Dyche (Feb. 5, 1919), supra note 310; Letter from Wigmore to
Dyche (Feb. 15, 1919), supra note 310; Leonard, supra note 315, at 12–13.
318
See Leonard, supra note 315, at 16; see also NW. UNIV., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCIAL CAMPAIGN (1919); N.U. to Expend $4,450,000 on Campus in City, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10,
1919, at 1; Northwestern Drive for Building Fund On, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 1919, at 3.
319
See Deed from Arthur L. Farwell & Katherine I. Farwell to Northwestern University (July 13,
1920) [hereinafter Farwell Deed]; NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES 1920–
21, at 6–7 (meeting of July 13, 1920).
320
See NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES 1920–21, at 14–17 (meeting
of Oct. 26, 1920); see also N.W.U. Chicago Campus Bought for $1,500,000: Option Exercised on Eve
of Expiration, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1920, at 5 (reporting that Northwestern would “buy the FairbanksFarwell nine acre tract at Chicago avenue and Lake Shore drive” for a purchase price of “about
$1,500,000”). The university would add to this area in 1927. See N.U. Will Add to Its Campus on North
Side, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1927, at 1 (noting purchase price of $2,000,000).
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nine to fourteen acres.321 The Newberry property, located immediately
south of the original purchase, on the north side of Huron Street between
Lake Shore Drive and Fairbanks Court, cost Northwestern approximately
$2,185,000.322
The deeds of conveyance in both 1920 and 1927 hint at the uncertain
state of title to this land. The grantors of the Farwell property, Arthur and
Katherine Farwell, were the son and daughter-in-law of John V. Farwell.
Their deed of conveyance to the university was a special warranty deed—
that is, a deed in which the grantors warranted that they had done nothing
to impair title during their ownership (in this instance, since they had
inherited the land from John Farwell), but did not guarantee against defects
in title existing before they acquired the property.323 As for the Fairbank
property, whose title Northwestern took via a “trustees’ deed,”
Northwestern was aware of “certain objections to the title to a small portion
of the property” and regarded it as “unwise” to obtain that portion “at the
present time.”324 Moreover, citing “litigation pertaining to the titles in this
neighborhood,” the board of trustees decided to seek title insurance for the
Farwell and Fairbank properties.325 And the 1927 deed of conveyance
(covering the Newberry property) was a quitclaim deed, which provided no
warranty of title at all.326 Typically, special warranty deeds and quitclaim
deeds signal potential flaws in the title, and land conveyed by these deeds
generally commands a lower price.327
There is an interesting clue as to how at least some of the money to
pay for the 1920 purchases was raised. MacChesney served on the board of
directors of an organization called the North Central Association,
consisting mostly of real estate investors and businesses having interests in
the area north of the Chicago River. For example, the association’s board
included, in addition to MacChesney, representatives of the Palmer estate,
the Ogden estate, the McCormick estate, the Farwell family, and the
Fairbank family.328 Correspondence between the organization and
321

See N.U. Will Add to Its Campus on North Side, supra note 320; Northwestern in Chicago, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 8, 1927, at 10; see also Deed from Newberry Library to Northwestern University (July 1,
1927) [hereinafter Deed from Newberry Library].
322
See Deed from Newberry Library, supra note 321 (reflecting purchase price of $2,184,833);
WILLIAMSON & WILD, supra note 316, at 155. By 1929, Northwestern completed Passavant Hospital on
the Newberry property but had to stop all further construction plans for approximately thirty years,
primarily because of the emergence of both the Great Depression and World War II. See id.
323
See Farwell Deed, supra note 319.
324
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES 1920–21, at 14–17 (meeting of
Oct. 26, 1920).
325
Id. at 23–24 (meeting of Sept. 29, 1920).
326
See Deed from Newberry Library, supra note 321.
327
Cf. Waterman Hall v. Waterman, 220 Ill. 569, 574, 77 N.E. 142, 144 (1906).
328
See Memorandum from Bertram M. Winston, N. Cent. Ass’n, to Nathan W. MacChesney et al.
2 (Apr. 30, 1920) (listing MacChesney and the others on the letterhead).
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MacChesney reveals that the North Central Association was actively
engaged in soliciting its members to contribute financially to Northwestern
to provide the funds for the purchase of the Streeterville property. A
“bulletin” issued to “members” and “friends” stated bluntly that the
proposed project “is of particularly great commercial value to the
surrounding neighborhood.”329 Specifically, “[i]t will encourage to the
South of Chicago Avenue, a high type of business development which will
be of tremendous value to the surrounding real estate; it will also protect
the wonderful residential section to the North from business
encroachment.”330
MacChesney was, to put the best face on it, working to advance the
interests of both sides of the deal. His friends and clients among the St.
Clair Street owners wanted a “prestige” development to enhance the
reputation of Streeterville and legitimize it as a location for future
development. Meanwhile, Northwestern needed a site for a new campus
and was short of cash to pay for it. There is no evidence from the archival
record that MacChesney specifically informed the Northwestern Board of
Trustees that land values in Streeterville were depressed because the title
was clouded.331 Nor is there any evidence he informed the board that
constructing its campus in this area might help to resolve the title issue, at
least as a matter of public perception, and hence enhance the value of the
remaining holdings of the St. Clair Street owners with whom MacChesney
was associated. Nor is it clear that the trustees had any explicit
understanding that the owners would donate part of the funds that the
university required to acquire the land, although it is plausible that there
was at least a tacit agreement to this effect.
Once the Farwell land was acquired in 1920, Wigmore and others
made further efforts to raise the money for construction. Levy Mayer’s
widow and Judge Gary provided support for a new law school, the
cornerstone of which was laid in 1926.332 Montgomery Ward’s widow and
daughter made major gifts that made possible the construction of the
medical school building, also dedicated in that year.333
After Northwestern’s Gothic-revival campus went up, development of
Streeterville began to take off. Northwestern’s commitment to the area was
329

To the Members of the North Central Association and Its Friends, N. CENT. BULL. (N. Cent.
Ass’n, Chicago, Ill.), May 5, 1920 [hereinafter N. Cent. Ass’n]; see also Northwestern Drive for
Building Fund On, supra note 318 (reporting that “[r]eal estate operators and those who have been
studying the district . . . see a tremendous advance in property values as the result of the university’s
project”).
330
N. Cent. Ass’n, supra note 329.
331
In his initial report to the board about locating the professional school campus north of the
Chicago River, MacChesney had merely noted that once the Michigan Avenue bridge was completed,
land values in the area would likely rise. See MacChesney, supra note 315, at 164.
332
See ROALFE, supra note 309, at 157–58, 174–75.
333
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1465 n.267.
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not the only cause. The opening of the Michigan Avenue bridge and the
widening (and renaming) of Michigan Avenue in 1920 made the area more
accessible.334 And the construction of the posh Drake Hotel the same year
lent considerable cachet to the neighborhood.335 Still, the central area of
Streeterville remained largely vacant of buildings until Northwestern made
its move. After 1926, commercial construction activity proceeded at a more
rapid pace. Figure 21, reflecting our research, traces the progress of new
building in Streeterville from 1910 to 1925 to 1938. Further development
would be disrupted by the Great Depression and World War II—but never
again by doubts about the validity of the legal title to the land.
FIGURE 20: NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY CHICAGO CAMPUS (1939)336

334

See ELIZABETH MCNULTY, CHICAGO: THEN AND NOW 58 (2007).
See The Drake, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1920, at 8; New Year’s Parties Will Mark Formal Opening
of Drake, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1920, at 25.
336
On file with the Northwestern University Archives. This view looks south toward the buildings
on Chicago Avenue, including Levy Mayer Hall, and beyond Chicago Avenue to include (in the
easternmost portion) a view of the Furniture Mart. Cf. supra note 260 and accompanying text.
335
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FIGURE 21: STREETERVILLE BUILDINGS—1910, 1925, 1938
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CONCLUSION
Whether by luck or design, Streeterville was eventually transformed
from submerged land into a neighborhood of Chicago regarded as
conventional (if especially valuable) real estate. The period of
transformation, which started in the 1830s and was fully completed only a
century later, was marked by extraordinary competition over who would
garner the prize of new solid land. The contestants came from all walks of
life, from squatters armed with guns to con artists to Indian tribes to
Chicago’s wealthiest families and their sophisticated advisors.
The competition was made possible in significant part by legal
uncertainty over the status of new land formed where water once stood.
The governing rules were sufficiently unclear, and were sufficiently
susceptible of manipulation, that few citizens had any idea who was in
control of this resource. As a result, nothing seemed to eliminate the
collective intuition that it was up for grabs. Neither physical invasion, nor
armed guards, nor fences, nor street construction, nor legislation, nor court
decisions seemed to end the competition. The only solution was for one of
the contesting groups to seize control of the asset, engage in substantial
development, and hang on. Solid land, at least when it has been occupied in
a visible way, is a resource susceptible of stable control and use. Vacant
land reclaimed from water, it would seem, is not.
It is also noteworthy that Streeterville, which consists predominantly
of artificial landfill protected by the public trust doctrine, is today mostly
private property. The exceptions are the small park east of the Chicago
pumping station, which the Lincoln Park Commissioners, seeing no private
owner to claim the reclaimed land, decided should become a city park, and
the beaches outside Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street and Ohio Street. The
main reason for the dearth of public land is the weakness of the public trust
doctrine. The trustee of the vast trove of submerged land under Lake
Michigan was the Illinois legislature, and the Illinois Supreme Court, in the
Kirk case, was happy to defer to the trustee about the proper disposition of
this resource, given the vagueness of the trust. Grant Park to the south,
which also consists of landfill protected by the public trust doctrine, was
saved for public use by the public dedication doctrine, not the public trust
doctrine.337 But given the repudiation of the Public Land Office survey in
1896, Streeterville has no official survey or plat. Thus, there is no formal
designation of public space to which the public dedication doctrine might
attach. It would take many decades before state institutions would become
strong enough to protect public rights along the lakeshore, without the aid
of private rights aligned with the cause of preservation. By the time the

337

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1418–22 (summarizing the role of each doctrine in the
context of Grant Park).
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State of Illinois was sufficiently robust to play this role, Streeterville was
securely held as private land.
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